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## REISS AS A FORENSIC SCIENTIST AND A CRIMINALIST

Speech at the 64<sup>th</sup> International Belgrade Book Fare held on October 21, 2019

**Olivier Ribaux<sup>1</sup>**

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*Faculty of Law, Criminal Justice and Public Administration*

*School of Forensic Science, Lausanne, Switzerland*

Dear Publisher's Representatives,

Thank you for inviting me to this event, namely the release of a series of books dedicated to the life and work of Archibald Reiss.

As the current director of the school Reiss founded in Lausanne in 1909, I will concentrate now on volume III, which is dedicated to his scientific contribution. Specially, it covers the period he spent at the University of Lausanne, in Switzerland. I was happy to write a foreword to this book. In particular, we met in Lausanne with the people who designed this volume. I could appreciate their professionalism and commitment to the project.

A book is a beautiful object. I must admit that even in the digital age, I remain sensitive to the physical object itself. It concretizes these impressive efforts made by the whole team which has spent countless hours on this project.

This book is also beautiful thanks to the images it contains. Let us not forget that Reiss was a photographer at the forefront of technology of his day.

He was the Editor-in-Chief of two specialized journals between 1899 and 1906. In August 1903, he organized the third congress of the International Union of Photography in Lausanne.

He also ran a photography department at the service of the state and created the radiology department of the hospital.

Little by little, Reiss developed a specific interest in a particular kind of photography: the photography aimed at supporting investigation and criminal procedures. In fact, the images in the book are taken with the idea of investigating.

Hence, the form (the beautiful book well imaged) helps us to smoothly turn

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to its content. The book focuses on the integration of science and justice with the result of constructing a new discipline still named today in different ways: criminalistics, police science or forensic science.

Reiss was a little more precise about the delineation of his project. He rejected the too theoretical movement that was proposed by the Italian school around criminal anthropology (what has been integrated now within the discipline of criminology). Reiss wanted to remain down to earth. His discipline should remain useful to solve current and practical problems.

This sounds like a current movement that says that what is really important in a research is its impact, that is the positive changes it brings to society. This might be a return in comparison of how academic structures have focused the evaluation of their outcome during at least the last two decades: Reiss would probably have been relatively indifferent to traditional academic indicators such as a number of publications or a number of citations. He would have been much more dedicated to find other indicators for evaluating the real value of a research and its practical impact.

Another turning point is widely visible in academic structures, which goes again in the direction proposed by Reiss. Academic disciplines have developed in silos during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, building largely fragmented and occasionally unproductive structures along the traditional disciplines. Sociology, psychology, law, chemistry, physics or mathematics cannot alone provide significant progresses in the study of crime. The construction of transversal models

through interdisciplinary and collective endeavour is progressively recognized as a more efficient approach to solve practical problems.

A return to such a position has probably never been more important than today to decipher in an interdisciplinary way the digital transformations that we face and which destabilize our societies.

In this perspective, I would recommend current high ranked managers to read this volume about the scientific contribution of Reiss. It will help them take distance with academic traditions and fragmented, technically-focused visions that are still pervasive.

We must, however, give a warning, and a key to decipher the texts. As we know, the notion of crime is evolving with societies, cultures. Ways of addressing crime have changed dramatically over time. Reading the book hence requires making an effort in order to abstract from the very particular context of the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. If the reader makes this effort, he or she will be then rewarded by discovering the modern model that still grounds the scientific development of the School of Criminal Justice of the University of Lausanne.

This particular volume is finally one part of a whole. As often, the whole is probably much more than the sum of its parts. This whole has still to be discovered by reading the entire series of book.

Please receive my respectful congratulations for having accomplished the difficult task of having brought together such a great content in this beautiful series of books!





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## THE IMPACT OF SHIFT WORK ON NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF POLICE OFFICERS

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**Abstract:** The aim of this study was to show the extent of the influence of the shift work on nutritional status and physical activity of police officers. The research included 130 healthy police officers. The respondents were divided into two groups. The first group included 82 officers who were working the first shift. The second group included 48 officers who were working the 12-hour shift. The study used customized questionnaire consisting of questions regarding leisure-time physical activity, self-report lifestyle activity level, body height, body mass, and derived body mass index (BMI). The ANOVA analysis showed that the first shift had significantly lower BMI ( $2.57 \text{ kg/m}^2$ ,  $p = 0.004$ ) than the 12-hour shift. The results showed that physical activity is strongly associated with lower values of BMI in both groups ( $p < 0.01$ ). Regarding the correlation between age and years of service, only the 12-hour shift showed coherency ( $p < 0.01$ ). Although there was no difference in the level of physical activity between police officers from different shifts, declines in physical activity were associated with higher values of BMI.

**Keywords:** body mass index, questionnaire, physical activity, police.

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## INTRODUCTION

Obesity has become one of the biggest public health problems in the world (WHO, 2017). A large study conducted by 155 authors revealed that 107.7 million children (uncertainty interval, 101.1 to 115.1) and 603.7 million adults (uncertainty interval, 592.9 to 615.6) were obese worldwide (Afshin et al., 2017). For instance, 56.3% adults aged 20 years and above were overweight and 21.2% were obese in Serbia in 2013 (Boričić et al., 2014), which is above the world's average of about 12% reported by Afshin et al. (2017). It represents one of the leading public health problems in today's societies, both developed or developing, of low, medium or high income (Dinsa, Goryakin, Fumagalli, & Suhrcke, 2012). Moreover, obesity has been associated with early death, cancer, coronary heart disease, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, chronic kidney disease, lower quality of life and sleeping problems (Afshin et al., 2017; Violanti et al., 2006). Considering this, the global health community has been working on developing assessments, treatments and prevention policies to address obesity, which would provide timely information about the changes in the prevalence of obesity and its effects on health at the population level.

One of the first indicators of nutritional status has been body mass index (BMI), developed in 1832 by Adolphe Quetelet who divided bodyweight in kilograms by body height in meters squared – kg/m<sup>2</sup> (Eknoyan, 2008). Nowadays, BMI is standardized estimator of underweight, normal, overweight and obese nutritional status, used by the World Health Organization (WHO) but also adopted in occupational health and performance by institutions such as police agencies (Dawes et al., 2019; Dopsaj & Vuković,

2015; Kukić, Čvorović, Dawes, Orr, & Dopsaj, 2018; Kukić & Dopsaj, 2016; Mitrović, Djordjević, Dopsaj, & Vučković, 2015; Riebe, Ehrman, Liguori, & Megal, 2018; Sorensen, Smolander, Louhevaara, Korhonen, & Oja, 2000; WHO, 2017). Police agencies have always been responsible for the safety and security of public and, as such, police officers have been considered physically healthy and ready to act (Anderson, Plecas, & Segger, 2001). In contrast, technological development enabled police agencies to introduce preventive measures that chiefly rely on skills and knowledge that are mostly sedentary in nature (Fahsing & Ask, 2016). In that regard, physical fitness of police officers could be defined as health-related and performance-related, depending on their occupational tasks (Anderson et al., 2001; Kukić & Čvorović, 2019; Riebe et al., 2018), whereby nutritional status measured by BMI is highly associated with both health and performance of police officers (Charles et al., 2008; Garbarino & Magnavita, 2015; Gu et al., 2012; Kukić et al., 2018; Mitrović et al., 2015; Violanti et al., 2006).

Charles et al. (2008) found an inverse association between the adiposity measures such as waist circumference, waist-to-height ratio and BMI and oxidative stress score (calculated from glutathione and glutathione peroxidase) among male police officers. Furthermore, a 5-year follow-up study revealed that officers within the highest quartile of stress had significantly higher levels of triglycerides and lower levels of HDL-cholesterol and an increased risk of developing metabolic syndrome compared to their colleagues in the lowest quartile of stress (Garbarino & Magnavita, 2015). Gu et al. (2012) found that the male po-



lice officers who worked the midnight shift, working longer hours, had larger waist circumferences and higher BMI. On the other hand, Dawes et al. (2014) showed a negative association between BMI and 1.5 km running performance, while Mitrović et al. (2015) showed that police officers with higher BMI (above 30 kg/m<sup>2</sup>) had significantly lower average running velocity (mean difference = 0.364 m/s,  $p = 0.021$ ) during a 3000-m running test, compared to officers with normal BMI (25 kg/m<sup>2</sup>). Furthermore, Kukic et al. (2018) found that police employees whose BMI was above 25.7 kg/m<sup>2</sup> performed significantly lower number of sit-ups for 60 s ( $p = 0.021$ ) and were slower on 800-m running test ( $p = 0.038$ ). Thus, simple and easily accessible measure of nutritional status such as BMI has been repeatedly shown as a valid general pre-screening indicator of health and performance-related physical fitness status of police officers.

The utilization of BMI could be additionally justified by its consistent association with biological and socioeconomic factors such as age, sex, education, occupation, income, etc. that could affect people's lives in various ways (Boyce, Jones, & Lloyd, 2008; Kukic et al., 2019; Sorensen et al., 2000). Study on differences in body composition of female police officers revealed a significant difference of 4.81 kg/m<sup>2</sup> (19.17 %) in BMI between the officers of different age, whereby older officers (36-40 years) had higher values of BMI than their younger colleagues who were 21-25 years old (Kukic et al., 2019). Similarly, the study on differences between the male police cadets and police officers revealed 14.23% lower mean BMI values and 14% lower obesity prevalence in cadets than in police officers, while the difference in age was about 10 years (Kukić, Čvorović, Dawes, & Kor-

panovski, 2017). Furthermore, longitudinal follow-up study on 103 Finnish police officers found that the overweight proportion (BMI  $\geq 25$  kg/m<sup>2</sup>) was considerably lower in 1981 than in 1996 (29% vs. 51%, respectively); almost 2/3 of the officers (64%) had a waist circumference above 94 cm, and more than 1/3 (38%) had a waist circumference above 102 cm (Sorensen et al., 2000). Boyce et al. (2008) found that the time spent on working as a police officer contributed to significant increase in body mass, fat percentage and fat mass. Conversely, Čvorović et al. (2018) showed that significant improvements (7.48% decrease,  $p < 0.001$ ) in BMI occur after 12 weeks of physical training among police trainees. Additionally, recent study on overweight and obese police officers revealed that an 8-week exercise intervention significantly reduced the body mass by 4.9 kg (4.7%) and percentage of body fat by 5.9% (Kukić & Čvorović, 2019). Finally, Vuković et al. (2019) investigated the effects of frequency and volume of leisure time physical activity (LTPA) on body composition of police officers and found that those who were physically more active in their leisure time, had lower percentage of body fat and body fat mass index than officers who were less physically active or inactive. Considering the above mentioned, it could be concluded that age, occupation, time spent in service, physical activity and lifestyle are factors that may significantly affect police officers' BMI.

One of the greatest disadvantages of police occupation has been shift work, as it was found to be associated with the rearrangement in awake and sleep pattern, causing the disruption of circadian rhythm (James, Honn, Gaddameedhi & Van Dongen, 2017). This in turn may lead to an internal de-synchronization



and subsequent psychological and physiological disturbances (Vila, 2006), depression, decreased cognitive abilities, and fatigue (Rouch, Wild, Ansiau, & Marquié, 2005). The changes caused by shift work may lead to short sleep and long awake hours (i.e., night shift, 12h or 24h shift), which could contribute to the development of chronic diseases, increased prevalence of cardiovascular disease and obesity (Charles et al., 2011). Irregular sleep routine may be worsening by psychological stress and fatigue that are typical for police work

(Ramey, Downing, & Franke, 2009). Although some effort has been involved in research regarding the effects of shift work on officers' health, the interactions between the shift work and factors such as age and LTPA have not been defined yet. Given that the shift work seems to be a significant mediator that may have effect on obesity, health and quality of life, the aim of this study was to investigate if shift work is associated with LTPA and BMI; and whether officers who work in different shift patterns have different habits.

## METHODOLOGY

### *Subject samples*

Healthy police officers from the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia were recruited from the administrative unit of Kikinda, which consists of six municipalities: Kikinda, Kanjiža, Čoka, Senta, Ada and Novi Kneževac. The data of 130 police officers was collected during July 2019 and the sample was divided into two groups relative to work shift, because duties in these two groups were different. The first group included 82 officers who were working in the first shift from 07:00-15:00 five days a week and conducted general duties such as administrative affairs, logistics department, analytics department and human resources. The second group included 48 officers who were working in 12-hour shifts meaning they were working 12-hour day shift then had 24-hour rest, followed by 12-hour night-shift of 12 hours and 48-hour rest, whose

duties mainly consisted of patrolling the city (in car or walking) and emergency interventions. Based on a letter from the Dean of the Faculty of Sport, University Union-Nikola Tesla, to Kikinda police department, the Chief of Kikinda police department approved the survey to be conducted. The Chief of Kikinda police department approved the data collection and each subject was well informed about the purpose of the study, and all the invited agreed to participate. The research was carried out in accordance with the conditions of the declaration of Helsinki and the recommendations of the guiding physicians in biomedical research involving human subjects (Williams, 2008), and with the ethical approval number 484-2 of the ethical board of the Faculty of Sport and Physical Education, University of Belgrade.



### *Anthropometrics, physical activity level and lifestyle*

The anthropometric data, physical activity level and lifestyle were self-administered using a customized questionnaire that was made using the questions from standardized questionnaires. The self-report data on BH and BM and BMI derived from it were shown to be accurate as Paired samples t-tests revealed no significant differences in estimated and measured BH ( $p = 0.830$ ), BM ( $p = 0.527$ ) or BMI ( $p = 0.623$ ) (Dawes et al., 2019). The questions regarding the activity level were taken from the International Physical Activity Questionnaire and used according to procedure reported on the Serbian population in Vuković et al. (2019). The International Physical Activity Questionnaire was shown to be valid and reliable (Craig et al., 2003).

The customized questionnaire included the following questions and answers:

- 1) What is your body height?
- 2) What is your body mass?
- 3) Length of service in police (years)?
- 4) In the last six months, how many times per week did you exercise?  
(1 – I do not exercise; 2 – 1-2 times; 3 – 3-5 times; 4 – more than 5 times)
- 5) What was the average volume of a single training session?  
(1 – No; 2 – < 30 min; 3 – 30-60 min; 4 – 60-90 min; 5 – > 90 min.)
- 6) How would you grade your lifestyle (0-7, 0 – inactive, 7 – extremely active) in terms of physical activity?  
( 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7 )

### *Statistical analyses*

A descriptive statistical analysis provided means, standard deviation (SD), coefficient of variation (cV%), minimum (Min) and Maximum (Max). The relationships between the BMI and two questions (Age and Length of service) were assessed by the Pearson's correlations. Due to its different question structure (Weekly frequency of physical activity, Average volume of a single training session, Grade your lifestyle on the scale (0-7) in terms of physical activity), Spearman's correlation test was used. Significant threshold for statistical differences (Pearson's and Spearman's

correlation) was at 95% of level of probability, level  $p < 0.05$ . Differences between groups were evaluated by analysis of variance (ANOVA), and by using least significant difference (LSD) post-hoc test. The magnitude of correlations was defined as small = 0.20 – 0.49, medium = 0.50 – 0.79 and large > 0.80 (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012). All statistical procedures were carried out using the Microsoft Office Excel (Microsoft Co., Seattle, WA, USA) and the SPSS for Windows, Release 17.0 (IBM, Armonk, NY, USA). Alpha was set at 0.05.





## RESULTS

The descriptive statistics for mean, standard deviation (SD), coefficient of variation (cV%), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) for the main characteristics of both groups is shown in Table

1. Furthermore, the distribution of subjects relative to their answers on each of the questions from the questionnaire is shown in Table 2.

**Table 1.** *Descriptive statistics for the main characteristics*

Variables	First shift (n = 82)				12h Shift (n = 48)			
	Mean ± SD	%cV	Min	Max	Mean ± SD	%cV	Min	Max
Age (years)	41.10 ± 7.67	18.66	24.00	57.00	38.54 ± 8.39	21.77	24.00	54.00
BH (cm)	175.93 ± 7.72	4.39	160.00	193.00	180.83 ± 6.50	3.59	170.00	202.00
BM (kg)	82.32 ± 17.54	21.31	54.00	137.00	95.00 ± 16.42	17.28	58.00	150.00
BMI (kg/m <sup>2</sup> )	26.40 ± 4.24	16.06	18.94	37.95	28.97 ± 4.58	15.81	19.61	46.30
Length of service	16.70 ± 7.23	43.32	1.00	33.00	15.71 ± 8.29	52.77	1.00	33.00

**BH** – Body height; **BM** – Body mass; **BMI** – Body mass index

**Table 2.** *Frequency and percentage of represented variables regarding the shift*

Variables		First shift (n = 82)		12h Shift (n = 48)	
		Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Weekly frequency of physical activity	Never	22	26.8	11	22.9
	1-2 times	25	30.5	18	37.5
	3-5 times	30	36.6	14	29.2
	5 +	5	6.1	5	10.4
Average volume of a single training session	No	24	29.3	15	31.3
	< 30 min.	14	17.1	8	16.7
	30-60 min.	36	43.9	15	31.3
	60-90 min.	7	8.5	7	14.6
Lifestyle grade (0-7) in terms of physical activity	> 90 min.	1	1.2	3	6.3
	0	11	13.4	6	12.5
	1	16	19.5	8	16.7
	2	14	17.1	8	16.7
	3	20	24.4	10	20.8
	4	0	0	1	2.1
	5	10	12.2	6	12.5
	6	5	6.1	3	6.3
	7	6	7.3	6	12.5



The ANOVA analysis showed that the first shift had significantly lower BMI (2.57 kg/m<sup>2</sup>) than the 12h shift, while all other variables such as age, length of service and habits related to physical activity did not differ between the groups (Table 3). However, the correlation analysis revealed significant within-group associations of these variables and BMI

(Table 4). The age and length of service correlated to BMI in the 12h shift group, but not in the first shift. Weekly frequency of physical activity correlated to the BMI of the first shift only, while average volume of a single training session and self-graded lifestyle correlated to BMI of both groups.

**Table 3.** Univariate tests - ANOVA

Variable	F	p
BMI (kg/m <sup>2</sup> )	4.562	0.004
Age (years)	2.079	0.104
Length of service (years)	0.814	0.487
Weekly frequency of physical activity (No)	0.159	0.924
Average volume of a single training session	0.362	0.781
Lifestyle grade (0-7) in terms of physical activity	0.805	0.492

**Table 4.** Pearson's and Spearman's correlation coefficients

Variables	BMI (kg/m <sup>2</sup> )	
	First shift (n = 82)	12h Shift (n = 48)
Age (years)	0.037	<b>0.398**</b>
Length of service (years)	0.123	<b>0.455**</b>
Weekly frequency of physical activity	<b>-0.339††</b>	-0.153
Average volume of a single training session	<b>-0.293††</b>	<b>-0.308†</b>
Lifestyle grade (0-7) in terms of physical activity	<b>-0.257††</b>	<b>-0.450††</b>

\*\*Significant at  $p < 0.01$  by Pearson's correlation, †† Significant at  $p < 0.01$  Spearman's correlation;

† Significant at  $p < 0.05$  Spearman's correlation

## DISCUSSION

The main findings of this study revealed that police officers who worked in the first shift had lower BMI levels than those from the 12h shift. Hence, it seems that the working shift is significant mod-

ifying factor of association between the BMI and F-LTPA, because correlation was significant in the first shift and insignificant in the 12h shift. A small, but significant association of BMI with the





volume of a single training session and self-graded physical activity in both investigated shifts suggests that working shift may not affect these associations in investigated population. Therefore, the working shift and physical activity seem to be independent factors that significantly affected the BMI of police officers. The ANOVA from this study showed that police officers from different shifts were not significantly different in any of the investigated indicators of physical activity, which could be due to different strategies that they use in order to maintain or improve their body composition (Čvorović, Kukić, et al., 2018; Kukić & Čvorović, 2019; Kukic, Dopsaj, Dawes, & Prcic, 2018; Vuković et al., 2019). For instance, the first shift reflects in stable duty hours that start in the morning and finish early afternoon, allowing police officers more convenient planning of their day. In contrast, the 12h shift consists of 12 hours of duty, 24 hours of rest, 12 hours of duty and 48 hours of rest, respectively, coupled with night duty. This schedule makes planning and implementation of the planned activities very difficult. The problem with BMI as an indicator of nutritional status lies in its inability to distinguish those who possess higher levels of BMI due to increased amount of body fat or skeletal muscle mass (Kukić et al., 2018; Kukic, Dopsaj, Dawes, Orr, & Cvorovic, 2018). Thus, it is not clear what the source could be of higher BMI in police officers from the 12h shift. However, the BMI of above 27.5 kg/m<sup>2</sup> was shown to negatively impact physical performance of police employees even when based on hyper developed muscle mass (Kukić et al., 2018; Mitrović et al., 2015). In that regard, considering that the duty of the officers from the 12h shift is mostly in

the field, their mean BMI seems overly increased.

Those who work in the occupation of policing face may physically demanding challenges that require muscular strength and endurance, aerobic endurance, power, and/or specific skill (Maupin, D., Wills, Orr, & Schram, 2018). Examples are foot chasing a suspect, arresting belligerent suspect, body drag, climbing fences, or conducting critical life-saving activities. However, these tasks happen occasionally, while majority of police work involves preventive tasks that are sedentary in nature, such as driving a patrol car, analysing evidence, writing reports, or interviewing persons. This imbalance in active/sedentary time at work places an officer at a higher risk of obesity (Dawes et al., 2019; Dopsaj & Vuković, 2015; Kukić & Dopsaj, 2016). Considering this, leisure time physical activity was found to be of importance for the maintenance and improvement of body composition of police officers (Čvorović, Kukić, et al., 2018; Čvorović, Orr, & Bacetić, 2018; Kukić & Čvorović, 2019; Kukic, Dopsaj, Dawes, & Prcic, 2018; Vuković et al., 2019). In that regard, the correlation analysis of the present study supports this as weekly frequency of physical activity was associated with lower values of BMI of officers from the first shift, which was not the case in officers from the 12h shift whose mean BMI was significantly higher.

Because of their stressful work routines, police officers are more vulnerable to poor lifestyles and sedentary behaviour (Kukić & Dopsaj, 2017). Moreover, it was observed that the age, time spent in service, shift work, career progression, and high levels of occupational stress have been factors that promote negative changes in body composition and BMI



of police officers (Boyce et al., 2008; Gu et al., 2012; Kukić et al., 2017; Kukic et al., 2019; Sorensen et al., 2000; Violanti et al., 2009). Occupational sitting coupled with aging was shown to be related to detrimental changes in lifestyle (Ćopić, Đordjević-Nikić, Rakić, Maksimović, & Dopsaj, 2019; Dimitrijević, Vuković, Ćopić, & Dopsaj, 2012). This may predispose them to greater risk of obesity and associated morbidities (Charles et al., 2008; Dopsaj & Vuković, 2015; Violanti et al., 2006). In order to reduce

health problems of the population, it is necessary to involve significantly more people into physical activity (Pratt, Macera, & Wang, 2000). Thus, improving officers' quality of life by utilizing holistic approach to occupational health that would implement strategies for increment in physical activity may have a positive impact on the prevention and reduction of obesity and maintenance or improvement in physical performance among police officers.

## CONCLUSIONS

The results obtained in this study demonstrate that the work shift could have complex implications for the level of physical activity and nutritional status of police officers. Although there was no difference in the level of physical activity between police officers from different shifts, declines in physical activity were associated with higher values of BMI. The consistency in lower values of BMI with age and time spent in service as factors that cannot be controlled and with physical activity as a controllable factor indicate that police agencies should implement

strategies that would promote increment in amount of physical activity. The frequency of LTPA of 3-5 times per week and volume of 150-300 minutes per week may serve as a good stress buffer, for improvement in physical performance, reduction in obesity prevalence and socializing with family, friends and colleagues. Ultimately, this could improve the performance of police agency and reduce the cost of medical coverage by reducing the number of injuries, sick days and cardiovascular problems.

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## A CONTRIBUTION TO DEFINING OF INTEGRITY TESTING IN POLICE : CRIME-INVESTIGATING ASPECTS

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**Abstract:** The shortcomings of reactive approach to suppression of corruption in police, as well as in other spheres of so-called consensual and “victimless crime” required introduction of proactive investigations and relying on covert methods of work. New crime-investigating strategy relies largely on building of professional integrity, as well as its testing, including integrity testing. This is a specific mode of simulated investigating methods which should show if the police officers in certain simulated situations are corrupt or prone to commission of other crimes, misusing their position and status. Although hypothetically any member of the police can be tested, the tendency is to do targeted testing, in other words to test those who are suspected of being criminalized. Considering that integrity testing is essentially simulated deal/activity, in which the subject is put into a simulated environment in order to see if he will commit an indictable act, it is important in its implementation to take care of encouraging, or acting in the role of agent provocateur.

**Keywords:** corruption, police, integrity testing, simulated investigating activities, targeted testing, random integrity test, provocation to commit crime.

### INTRODUCTION PROBLEMS OF INVESTIGATING POLICE CORRUPTION

The scope of corruption displayed within police force, as well as frequent and fast recidivism despite successfully completed and processed investigations in the last 20 years, brought into the spotlight the request for reform of approach to its prevention and repression. In that

context a considerable progress has been made when it comes to the selection and recruitment of future police officers, their training, investigations of complaints about their work and external control of policing. In addition to this, theory and practice have taken a

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stand that the strategy of suppression of corruption and other misuses in police must include spatial context of crime activities in criminal investigation (Милић, 2019) and specific, covert investigating techniques so that in addition to reactive approach, the unwanted consequences will also be met, as well as foreseen and prevented.

Traditionally, the majority of their human and material resources intended for internal control police dedicate to investigating citizen's complaints. The complaints filed against potentially responsible officers can be a significant indicator of irregularities or unlawful work, and this is why they should always be thoroughly investigated. In other words, it is necessary for every complaint, including the anonymous ones, to be documented and its grounds assessed in order to define the corresponding action taken starting from it – frequent and reliable procedure of complaint investigation is in the function of establishing essential trust between a state agency, on the one hand and citizens or the community, on the other hand. *However, what is the situation in reality?*

The majority of such reactive investigations during their realization inherently get the features of fierce conflict of the opposing sides – the complainants and the suspect, often including also real or imaginary witnesses to support their claims. The aggravating circumstances are that those who investigate the admissibility of complaint and the existence of guilt can hardly get any reliable material evidence which would support or refute the claims of either of the parties. Some authors point out that less than 20% of such reported cases are sustainable in initiated disciplinary or criminal proceedings (Rothlein, 2010). Such an

outcome is largely the result of unsuccessful proving, despite comprehensive investigations which sometimes may be compared with murder investigations or investigations of other serious crimes, which ultimately wears out both material and human investigating resources.

The data on corruption and other unethical conducts in police can be obtained from various sources – internal sources (police), informants, the public (citizens), other government services and agencies, auditing and supervision and similar. Relying only on intelligence data from internal department for supervision of legal conduct cannot give a complete picture. As in other investigations, here too we can come across suspects based on incorrect information, but also those coming under the *radar of control and supervision*. In addition to this, the witnesses to corruptive behaviour are often the citizens who are offenders themselves, or, from time to time, the co-workers of corrupt officers whose cooperation in investigations may be missing – in the first case due to the belief that (their) *word*, a word of an offender, against a police officer's would not be taken *seriously*, or in the second case due to feeling of collegiality and solidarity (IAB's integrity testing program, 2000). This is why it is believed that direct measuring of police corruption is not possible, as of any other latent criminal forms. However, the estimates are that between 0.5 and 1% of police personnel (potentially, not necessarily – authors' remark) are corrupt, and that unlawful activities most often include (Newburn, 2015):

– Disclosure (leaking) of information from the police organization, as a dominant form of unlawful conduct;





- Abuse of position and powers in order to get money and other material gain or sexual favours from citizens (for instance, prostitutes);
- Association with offenders in committing crimes;
- Stealing and malversations in course of raids, crime scene investigations, inquests and similar, and
- Using position within police organization in order to *undermine* the ongoing investigations.

In addition to the above said, unlawful conduct of police officers includes also selling, buying and using of illegal drugs, frauds, thefts, domestic violence, false reports on illnesses in order to get sick leaves, etc.

As a solution which should considerably increase the efficiency of repression of corruption and other unlawful behaviours in the police, there is application of *proactive investigations*, which is based on informants, the methods of covert supervision and monitoring of communications, secret agents or covert investigators, simulated actions, so called *anti-corruptive patrols* (discreet patrolling and presence of control officers in the areas known for gambling, prostitution, drug dealing, and similar, in order to spot corruptive activities) and *integrity testing* (Newburn, 2015). Specially trained and capable personnel as well as the most up-to-date technical equipment are of key significance for their successful realization.

It should bear in mind that in this case it is not a simple task to convert police officers, who previously implemented reactive approach for either long or short period of time. On the one hand, they

must get acquainted in detail with legal and by-legal regulations which deal with these problems, with special accent on avoiding supervision methods, primarily communications, against the standards of protection of the right to privacy, and acting in the capacity of *agent provocateur*, i.e. encouraging to unlawful behavior. On the other hand, when we talk about investigations of corruption in their own environment, it should bear in mind that the investigators face the professional police officers, who are well acquainted with methods of control and supervision they may be exposed to and who often have used and use them themselves. Their skill in such a balance of power enables them to protect themselves in situations when they are the most vulnerable and in such a way avoid being identified and their guilt proven.<sup>2</sup>

If the act of corruption is not detected, its perpetrator will continue with unlawful activities. The real danger is that through career promotion system such a person may be appointed to a senior position in the service they belong to, from where they can do much more damage. On the other hand, when a widely-spread network of corruption is revealed, there are measures to be conducted for its irradiation, which mostly consist of criminal prosecution of perpetrators and their dismissal from service. However, almost as a rule, after some time there come new cases of corruption – the belief that removing the *bad apples* (as the American literature prefers to call them) can solve the problem of police corruption proved incorrect. This is why the strategy of its repression must be constantly implemented through synergy of preventive,

<sup>2</sup> One of the key challenges in corruption investigations, which were noticed by the internal control personnel in England and Wales, were difficulties in using standard investigating techniques against corrupt police officers, which as a rule were well acquainted with crime-investigating methods and were in a good position to avoid being discovered.



proactive and repressive measures, so that the government bodies would not become *complacent* by the results they achieved.

The accent is therefore on the application of measures of *internal/external control and integrity testing*. The latter occur as especially useful in *cleaning* public services from corrupt, and maintenance of *cleanliness* once it is achieved.

## VARIOUS COMPREHENSIONS OF THE NOTION OF INTEGRITY TESTING

Conduct of individual(s) in certain situations is often defined by laws, customary or moral norms and standards, wherefrom the obligation comes, or expectation, that such rules and standards are respected and enforced. If this will really happen depends largely on the integrity of that individual's personality, in other words on his readiness and willingness to *resist challenges and temptations* which they come across in their work, and which mostly are connected with personal interests being put in the spotlight instead of wider general interest. To have *integrity* means to adopt unconditional and unwavering obligation towards established and agreed legal, moral, religious, cultural and other values and duties – integrity, on the one hand, includes honesty and respect of something which has previously been accepted and agreed, while on the other, it excludes corruptiveness and satisfaction of personal needs at the expense of defined rules and values.

Professional integrity may be defined as a feature and capability of a person to perform their professional duties and obligations honestly and spotlessly in accordance with law, exhibiting at that

high moral standard, correctness, impartiality and independence, respecting public interest and excluding any form of abuse of powers. From the aspect of work of civil servants who perform public duties, the integrity has a special relation to corruption – the more integrity means less corruption and vice versa, wherefrom it results that by defining professional integrity provides for its indirect measuring and testing in public authority bodies. The latter is especially important if we take into account that corruption as a phenomenon is very latent and difficult to measure.

Integrity testing as a method of getting knowledge/investigating method can be comprehended in its wider or narrower sense, in other words it can have wider or narrower scope of application. In a wider context, *integrity testing* is a term which includes a series of designed activities which are undertaken in order to check legality of action of public authorities in performing public jobs.<sup>3</sup> It implies putting these persons into simulated and monitored situations which require undertaking official actions or authorizations beyond their line of work, with the aim that those who do them, or according

<sup>3</sup> To that effect even the *UN Office on Drugs and Crime* (UNODC) defines integrity test as an anti-corruption measure consisting of engagement of undercover investigators/agents, who provide opportunity for civil servants to commit a corruptive act in a way that the evidence of their reaction can easily and credibly collected and presented, and that as a rule the evidence can be provided even in those cases when other measures and activities do not yield results.



to whose order the testing is done, get directly convinced if the tested persons behave in accordance with the law or not. All those performing public authorities, executive, legislative and judicial, can be subjected to integrity testing in the wider sense, although it is applied as a rule to the persons in the executive power or public administration, and therefore it should not be applied in the sphere of legislative and particularly judicial power.<sup>4</sup>

However, integrity testing as an investigative method in the majority of cases refers to police officers as those performing public authority. According to this, narrow understanding, *integrity testing in police is an investigative technique which consists of devising and creating simulated situations analogue to the real ones, which requires actions of police officers in order to check if their response is in accordance with legal regulations*. Testing is used to determine if police officers are involved in corruptive and other illicit activities, but it also increases the general perception of risk that the employees can be caught doing a corruptive action, if they opt for it. In addition to check the legality of action, in other words possible determination of penal liability, it can also check the quality of application of police powers.

Although the integrity testing primarily refers to police officers who use po-

lice powers in order to repress crime, maintain public peace and order, control traffic safety and similar, other people working in the police can also succumb to it, such as officers working on issuing personal and travelling documents, people in charge of official records, as well as other people doing logistics tasks – legal, information, material-financial, accounting and administrative. It is important that they are in a position within their workplace or related to their job to get involved in corruptive or other illegal activities.

Essentially, integrity testing is a modality of simulated activities as crime-investigating method which are applied by government bodies based on law in order to prevent and repress crime, wherefrom the conclusion comes that simulation, as legally prescribed investigating method, is conducted in two formally shaped models – the first one is *integrity testing*, while in the other case we are talking about *proving action of simulated deals/activities* (making and/or offering simulated deals and services, simulated accepting and/or giving bribe, simulated purchase/selling of a subject of crime). Both investigative techniques are based on creation of a controlled environment with a goal to check the readiness of a certain individual to undertake unlawful action. However, the *ratio* of devising and prescribing integrity testing is

<sup>4</sup> Moldova *Law on Professional Integrity Testing* (No. 325 of December 23, 2013) provides for rather a wide circle of institutions whose employees can be subjected to integrity testing: Parliament Secretariat, the Administration of the President of the Republic of Moldova, State Office, including its territorial offices, bodies of central specialized public administration (ministries, other central administrative bodies subordinate to the Government and organizational structures within their jurisdiction), the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the courts at all levels, the Prosecutor's office at all levels, the service for information and security, the State service for protection and security, the Centre for Human Rights, etc. In connection with this, it is particularly problematic that even judges are subject to testing, which violates the independence of judiciary and the principle of division of power, and also represents a considerable risk considering that the government can use testing as a way of punishing judges whose opinion does not suit them. This is why the laws which provide for application of testing on judges are at the very least controversial, considering that they represent an opportunity for abuse by executive or legislative power in relation to judiciary. This is the direction where even the conclusion of the Venice commission points to, which determined that 2014 Moldova Law on Professional Integrity Testing has potentially negative influence on judicial power. .



*special*, in other words *exceptional* in relation to simulated activities as a proving action. This specialty reflects in the particularity of a subject of investigation and the environment where they are tested – as a rule it is a *police officer who acts in that capacity in a certain situation*. In that context it can be concluded that integrity testing is actually a special form of simulated deals.

Formally legal relation of integrity testing and simulated deals/activities is defined by the legislator, or the law, whereas it should bear in mind the fact that in comparative law the simulated deals/activities are uniformly considered as a proving activity, which cannot be said for integrity testing.

In literature it is possible to find an understanding that integrity testing in police refers also to certain specific checking modalities, which are not classified as integrity testing in the true sense of

the word. Thus, for instance, members of special police forces can be tested, such as operatives in charge of drug enforcement or covert investigations, in the form of either regular and/or random medical controls of blood or urine for *presence of narcotics and other illegal substances* (Klockars *et al.*, 2007). Such tests should show if the officers who are considered risky, considering their frequent contact with psychoactive substances and/or extreme stress related to the work they do, take psychoactive substances or not, in other words if they have remained vice-free and reliable. Integrity testing can be performed using *lie detectors* in order to see if their integrity resisted the temptations which make an integral part of the work they do. Similar can be done during the selection of candidates who are to be admitted in certain police units – pre-employment testing, which makes an integral part of the procedure to fulfill criteria for admission to service.

## MODALITIES OF INTEGRITY TESTING IN POLICE – TARGETED AND RANDOM TESTING

Integrity testing in police is mainly conducted on a specific person for whom the information exists that as a part of their official engagement they violate legal norms which define and regulate it. It is testing undertaken based on *operative/intelligence information* and/or *reports of citizens*, and it is usually called *targeted*

*testing*.<sup>5</sup> The benefits of its application can be twofold – on the one hand, the suspect who avoids processing due to the lack of evidence will be identified in this way, punished and removed from police organization, which would again, on the other hand, have strong warning/intimidating, or preventive effect on other of-

<sup>5</sup> Thus, for instance, if for officer XY there are three anonymous and one signed report in a few months that he takes money from street sellers of concert tickets (so called '*ticket touts*') in return for non-reporting, in other words enables them to work, he should and might be a candidate for targeted testing. Also, the informant can also point to the corrupt officer XY, who has found out that XY is corroborating with certain stolen goods dealers, as a middleman between them and street sellers in a *flee market*. The typical reactive investigation would lead to XY negating the reports, justifying himself that the reports are actually the reponse of offenders to his incorruptiveness, so that they would tarnish his reputation and he be removed from the field. Such a defense might have sense, but also it should bear in mind that a large number of police officers do not have a single similar report during their entire careers, and this is why it can be concluded that ZY is a *good candidate* for a targeted integrity test.





ficers, sending them clear message that the same will happen to them if they opt for unlawful activities.

Opposite to the targeted testing, testing can also be carried out on previously undefined persons, or police officers for whom there is no knowledge that they are involved in illegal activities – this is so called *random integrity testing*. It should bear in mind at that that the selection of persons who are tested in such situations can be partially or completely arbitrary, in other words *random*. In the first case the members of police units are tested who within their lines of duty are exposed to high risk of corruption and other unlawful activities, because of which, regardless of the lack of suspicion of criminal behavior of concrete individuals in their ranks, should be checked from time to time. The same applies for those employed in the services who based on statistical analyses and risk assessment are identified as highly risky in terms of corruption, in order to reduce the risk of corruption.

On the other hand, completely random integrity tests are carried out with random sample/selection method and can

be used on anyone in any department/unit without some special selection criterion. Basically, the goal of their application is *twofold*. The first is to scan corruption problem at various levels of police organization – random tests are mainly conducted in combination with other factors in order to spot and approximately determine or refute or confirm statistically observed trends of corruption within certain structures in the police – they are compatible and mutually complementing with other identification methods and measuring of corruption in it. The other goal is essentially related to the phenomenon of *general prevention* – the existence and application of totally random integrity tests shape an opinion and awareness of police officers that they can always be checked/tested, which is deterring, or preventing, when it comes to opportunities to commit an unlawful activity.<sup>6</sup>

Some police services in the world, primarily in the USA, such as Los Angeles, New York and New Orleans police forces, routinely conduct random integrity testing of their officers (Rothlein, 2010). However, the analysis of its application

<sup>6</sup> In 2001 the journalists and editorial board of the ABC News TV network in the USA conducted a kind of experiment in order to test integrity of police officers. For that purpose they prepared 40 wallets with a certain amount of money in them, as well as identification details of their owners, which they delivered to police officers working in foot or car patrols as anonymous citizens, reporting that they found them in the street. The police officers had a choice – 1) to call the owner and inform him that his property has been found and to return the wallet with all its contents; 2) to take some money from the wallet or use a payment card in the wallet a few times before returning the wallet to the owner; 3) take the wallet with all its contents. At the same time, in both cities a certain number of citizens were questioned related to their opinion on how police officers in such or similar situations might respond. The citizens were quite sceptical. In LA the majority said that only about 50% officers would return a lost wallet, while in New York citizens were even more suspicious – they stated that even 19 of 20 police officers would spend a part or all of the money in the wallet and that they would not return them to their owners. However, the test results were a surprise to many people! All 40 tested police officers in both cities returned the wallets to their owners with all their respective contents. Thirty years earlier the same television conducted a similar test in Miami – *allegedly* found wallets were given to 31 police officers in the street. At that time nine kept the money which was in the wallet, after which they were fired from the service and/or criminally prosecuted. Quoted according to Rothlein (2010). Officers pass test on basic integrity, *The Observer*, Published May 19/ Updated February 13, 2016: “A million dollar question” – *Were the officers in 1970s more corruptible that thirty years later or the success of the second test was largely determined by their awareness that they might be subject to integrity testing and the fear of being monitored, which was not the case earlier (in the meantime a lot has been said and debated about integrity test, a lot of them got acquainted with this investigating technique, especially in police agencies)?*



showed that although (potentially) it can be useful, it still does not justify its existence, and that targeted testing has far more higher rate of successfulness (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001). On the other hand, *Transparency International* considers that random integrity testing in the fight against corruption has a significant deterring effect – it has been noticed that after it has been introduced there was a significant rise in reporting officers who were offered bribe or bribed officers, and that even a small portion of this rise can be attributed to the fact that police officers have at least become concerned in terms that they can be subject to checking and testing (Transparency International, 2000). Prenzler and Ronken conclude that frequent exposure of police to the possibilities of corruption and other illegal activities require undertaking several preventive strategies and that although the arguments for (further) application of random tests are currently rather weak, at least it should continue with experimenting in this field so that the ethical standards and respect of law in the police are maximized (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001).

The opinions of the majority of theorists are that the application of random integrity tests in the police should be avoided because of protection of freedom and rights of the testees, considering that in this way without a real ground they are exposed to application of specially sensitive, intrusive investigating activities, on the one hand, as well as to preserve the atmosphere of collegiality and mutual trust within the police organization, which is often necessary in conducting official tasks, on the other hand. It

should bear in mind that uncritical application of testing, especially random, together with the measures of secret control and supervision of communication of the employees, can lead to creation of *climate of paranoia* within the organization. In such an environment police officers would be under constant pressure and fear that they can always be controlled and checked in every place, and then start to suspect anyone and everything – from their coworkers to citizens they interact with, and they do not feel secure, comfortable and focused during solving the concrete problems, often bearing high risk to life and body.<sup>7</sup>

The existence of two integrity testing modalities, random and targeted, underlines much more than it is usual for other operative and proving measures and activities, the two goals of its application – *repressive and preventive*. Repressive primarily refers to targeted testing, while preventive is dominant, or is at the very least on the same level with repressive in random testing. Although simulated activities, and thus integrity testing, are basically undertaken in order to identify (potential) offenders and provide knowledge/evidence of their culpability in criminalistically ideal *in flagranti delicto* situations, they cannot be taken away their strong preventive, deterring role.

*Integrity tests are aimed at preventing corruptive activities through creation of sense of ever-presence – subjective perception of potential offender in the police ranks that every opportunity for illegal action actually presents a possible test, in other words a trap. The essence is that*

<sup>7</sup> *Hypothetically* – Two patrol officers come across robbers fleeing the store with weapons in their hands. Knowing that always and in any place they can be tested, they both can wonder if it was a real action or if his colleague is involved in a potential test scenario. Maybe they test me to see how I would act, if and in which way I would use firearms? While dilemma is going on, which will delay an adequate response the robbers may wound or kill a passer-by or officers.



*the probability of doing an unlawful act is certainly reduced if a person who wants and plans to do it knows that a seemingly*

*good opportunity for these needs can actually be simulated by the police.*

## SCENARIOS OF INTEGRITY TESTING IN THE POLICE

Generally, integrity testing can be used to determine any violation of official duty of a police member, such as unlawful application of powers, abuse of official position, dealing with work incompatible with police duty, prevention or misleading of criminal or other procedure before competent court, failing to report criminal offence or violation, unprofessional relationship to citizens, acting contrary to order or instructions for work performance, and similar. However, testing can be particularly successful in the following cases:

- 1) *various vorns of extortions from offenders* – for instance money or drugs from dealers, money or sexual favours from prostitutes, money or goods from street salesmen, trafficking in foreign currency, and similar;
- 2) *taking bribe in use of police powers and activities*, particularly in traffic control and issuing travelling and other documents;
- 3) *misappropriating found, delivered, seized or confiscated substances, objects or money*, most often during police raids or after them;
- 4) *unauthorized access to systems, data and information which hold the status of official secret*, other operative data and information, their revealing and submitting to people outside the police, especially offenders, which are related to criminal investigations of illegal activities.

Usually, in the beginning, the testing plan is made based on available information and documentation which initiate the check, or testing. The starting

point in its making and working out includes the suspect and his workplace, in other words the environment where he performs his official duties and for which suspicion of illegal acting is related – they are the *constant* which the investigating team and testing scenario realization must be adapted to. In case it is determined that it is impossible to conduct test according to the existing state-of-affairs, it is necessary to consider alternative solutions, which might include deploying the suspect into another service vehicle, another work shift, another location, and similar, taking account not to make him suspicious or to expose the application of the very measure.

The next step in working out of the plan of integrity testing, after the analysis of the suspect and the environment where there is illegal conduct, includes the selection of officers who will take active part in its realization and/or provide things which will be used during testing – money, *forged documents* to support the simulated scenario, for instance identity cards or driving licenses, then the appropriate uniforms, cars, sometimes even the subject of a crime, such as narcotics or substances similar to them, as well as other material and technical means (technical means for electronic surveillance and audio/video surveillance). The possibility is to be considered especially to hire a support team, while in order for objective assessment and evaluation of the results of professional integrity testing, it is necessary to record the course of its realization or





the behaviour of the testee in it by audio/video equipment.

Integrity testing means designing a scenario according to which a simulated situation will be realized, whereas it should bear in mind that the success of the entire operation depends on the degree of its reality. Accordingly, the test which is conducted according to not a well devised scenario and which is not lifelike/realistic is doomed to failure in advance – the suspect will easily see through it and realize that he is the subject of investigation which is why he will become more cautious or give up illegal activities for a short or long period of time.

Typical *scenarios* of police officer's integrity testing include:

- criminal investigator in the role of a citizen who hands over to a police officer the wallet found with certain amount of money, which he supposedly found, or takes it to a police station, monitoring its *destiny* – if finding of a wallet is entered into the official records and if, in case it is, there is a certain amount of money missing in it;
- leaving valuable object or money in the room or facility where a simulated crime was committed, for instance in a burgled house or a stolen vehicle, so that it could be determined if a police officer securing a crime scene or the members of a CSI team would file these valuables in accordance with the regulations or take them and hide them, in other words misappropriate them;
- criminal investigator in the role of a citizen committing a violation, for instance, violating public order and peace or endangering traffic safety, offering a bribe to a police officer in order to be let off unpunished;

– simulation of drug seizure or other valuable items of a crime, monitoring if they were filed by a police officer handling them, as well as if a certain amount of seized substances, money or other valuables is missing;

– simulated catching in the act of the offender or deviant persons and monitoring if the suspected officer extorts money from them, sexual favours, and similar in exchange for not reporting a crime;

– posing as an interested citizen, a criminal investigator offers bribe to a police officer in order to have certain document issued or some other request met circumventing the legal procedure;

– placing an untrue information carrying a sign 'classified' to a police officer who is suspected of illegally revealing them or placing such an information into a database and monitoring if it will be relayed to third persons by that officer.

The scenario according to which integrity test is to be carried out can be more or less complex, which depends on every specific situation. Thus, for instance, in case of suspicion that a traffic officer for whom there is an information to take bribe from drivers who were speeding or committed some other traffic violation, the scenario can be rather simple – it is sufficient for an authorized person to impersonate a citizen who commits violation with his vehicle in the part of the road controlled by the suspect. On the other hand, the suspicion that a police officer *sells information* to persons in the criminal world requires a complex scenario, which includes more people, use of surveillance, involvement of informants, and similar.



## THE ISSUE OF ENCOURAGING IN INTEGRITY TESTING

Integrity testing is one of modalities of simulation as criminal investigation method, and thus can be characterized also as a *covert operation with elements of simulation which are kind of misleading for a suspect*. In the countries with Anglo-Saxon legal system, as a general term for various forms of encouraging to a criminal act in simulated, controlled environment, in order to detect offender and prove his guilt, the term *sting operations* is used (Nash, 1992). The main problem in carrying out such an investigation from the aspect of protection of freedom and rights of citizens is the existence or inexistence of encouragement in the criminal-law sense. In other words, the question of *encouragement* is central and the most sensitive question in simulation as an investigation method, whether it is about integrity testing or a special evidencing action of simulated deals and services. Related to this, simulated investigating activities, including integrity testing, must be devised and realized in such a way that the persons who are tested are provided with equal chances to commit or not to commit a punishable act – their outcome must exclusively be the question of free will, i.e. free choice of the testee, he must not be *encouraged* to commit a crime. The environment where simulated activity is carried out and the manner in which this is done are such as to define a place and time of manifesting the offence (illegal, illicit behaviour), and not the decision on its commitment. In order to avoid the possibility to contest validity of the acquired evidence, as well as for them to gain additional strength, in practice the realization of simulated activities as a rule is documented by audio/video

equipment, which is often the obligation according to the law as well.

As other simulated activities, integrity testing can be realized in either the active or passive form of influence on the testee (a suspect), in other words *active and passive trial* (checking). Active influence implies *physical participation* of a subject who carries out the testing in a simulated activity and his *verbal contact* with the testee, which consists of giving proposals, considering possibilities and negotiating the details of commitment of an illicit activity, in other words a crime. As a rule, we are talking about investigations of illegal activities for whose manifestation it is necessary that two actors exist, who actively participate in them on their consensual will. Thus, for instance, investigating subject participating in the integrity test takes a role of a foreign citizen who seeks a working permit beyond the legal procedure, attempting to uncover corrupt police officers ready to provide such a permit; or a participant in traffic who commits violation in order to be spotted by a traffic officer, whom he will offer bribe in return for non punishment. It is exactly due to the fact that the person conducting the test in these cases is an active participant in simulating the environment within which an illegal act will take place and through which the readiness of a tested person to commit it will be shown, this kind of test contains an increased degree of danger of *encouragement*, in other words acting in the capacity of *agent provocateur*. In other words, active participation can include convincing, persuasion or even blackmailing as illicit acts, in order for the tested person to consent to an unlawful act and then be processed.



Unlike active, *passive simulation* includes creation of *objective opportunities and circumstances* suitable for commission of a punishable act, excluding *verbal or concludent contact* of the participating actors in terms of proposing and considering possibility for its commission. This can have two forms.

The first one implies putting certain objects and/or things into a certain place, or space, so that they represent attractive loot for potential offenders there in terms of their unlawful appropriation by stealing or hiding them. For instance, money or valuable jewelry are placed in a crime scene or in the street so that it seems lost or tossed – it will further be monitored if a police officer, after spotting them, will report and file them, or hand them over to a competent investigating authority or keep it for themselves. The second modality of passive simulation implies that *a police officer posing as a citizen – an attractive victim* is placed into a monitored environment, the place of crime commission, in order for the potential offender to be led to commit a crime against him, most often an act of violence, such as rape, although this can also be a property-related crime, for instance robbery, in a wider context even pickpocketing. This form of passive testing, or checking, considering its nature, is not possible for integrity testing, to which by definition police officers are subject when performing their duties.

Our opinion is that passive forms of provocation, due to their nature, exclude the possibility of encouragement to criminal act or other forms of behaviour which might make them unlawful, or illicit, although in practice of the prosecution or court and as such they are often treated as illicit.<sup>8</sup>

In the analysis of problems of encouragement in simulated activities the questions of *initiation of an unlawful act* and *unrealistically good offer* (*“indecent proposal”*) are of special significance, which are in direct connection with prohibition of influence on the autonomous will of a testee, in other words the decision to commit an illicit act. To that effect, theoretical thinking and court practice are mainly at the standpoint that (initial) proposal to commit a crime in a simulated environment should come from a potential offender and not the investigating subject. Thus his influence on the *idea been born* of incriminated act is avoided, which *might not even occur to the offender* if it was not suggested to him – the decision on unlawful behavior of a potential offender must exist independently from the proposal of the other side, which is most clearly established if he was to express it first.<sup>9</sup> What is previously stated is valid for simulated deals and the engagement of a covert investigator, or secret agent, as special evidencing activities.

8 In Serbia the prosecutor in motor vehicle thefts often considers as unlawful the evidence which police collected by catching the offender in the act in cases when a certain vehicle is placed as attractive loot to thieves by parking in a place suitable for stealing, such as a dark and isolated parking lot without system of protection. Such actions in the Anglo-Saxon and crime-investigation practice are called *honeypot operations* or *honeypot traps* and are allowed as a rule.

9 Thus, for instance, in repressing prostitution and detecting the users of sexual services in the US the police officers put their female officers in the streets who pose as prostitutes. For the investigation to be valid, *false prostitutes* must not approach the potential customers first and offer them services, but they must passively wait for them to contact them first, start conversation and agree to go to the place where they would have sexual intercourse, where they would actually be arrested. Naturally, as for the majority things in life, here also there may be exceptions which are best described by the practice of the USA courts related to decisions on the existence of *entrapment*.



However, the question is if the same applies for integrity testing as an investigating method, in other words if a tested police officer can and may be *offered bribe* or proposed to commit an illicit act, or perhaps wait for him to propose/suggest something like that on his own? According to our opinion, in this case the request to initiate an illicit act should not be taken into consideration when deciding if there is a provocation or not. Such an attitude results from the fact that here we do not have an ordinary citizen tested, but a police officer – his professional and personal integrity have to be so strong that not any proposal, not even persuasion, must lead him to illicit behavior in performing official duties. Accordingly, the scenario of *defense* of a testee according to which, from the aspect of guilt, as mitigating or even excluding circumstances the fact is taken that the illicit act was proposed to him, which resulted in his idea on its commitment being born, should not have any significance.

The second important question related to a simulated situation occurs in cases when the testee is provided with an *unrealistically good opportunity* to commit an illicit act. *Unrealistically good opportunity* could be defined as a situation in which the chances to commit a criminal offence, which as a rule leads to property gain, are such that on the one hand the offender almost certainly would not be discovered, while on the other hand, there is *unusually large material gain* for such an offence, due to which from the aspect of a potential offender it is simply *worth a risk*. In any case, such a situation in real life either does not occur or occurs rather

rarely, this is why the conduct of a testee in such a situation can hardly be taken as a paradigm of his real criminal will. For instance, the suspect in a simulated environment has been given an opportunity to take or seize a considerably large quantity of money with very low risk of disclosure and possible punishment. Such a chance with easy loot can be used by someone who can be characterized as an *honest person* who would (never) commit a criminal offence if it were not for such an *ideal opportunity*.<sup>10</sup>

In other words, *simulating an event with unrealistically good offer* sends a weak signal at best that the testee who has succumbed to temptation is a *real offender*. If we take into account earlier mentioned statement that simulated investigating activities make sense only in cases when they prove the guilt of those individuals who would commit the same or similar illicit act in a similar real situation, then simulated situations which in any segment considerably differ from life opportunities and circumstances, especially in terms of a tempting and unusually good opportunity to profit, even unlawful one, should be excluded.

However, we think that in this case also the difference should be made between simulated deals, as special investigating activities, and integrity testing of police officers. What was said about the significance of initiating an unlawful act in evaluation of responsibility of the testee applies in this case as well – *unrealistically good offer* in a simulated situation can and should be of significance as a special evidencing act whose integral part it makes, for determining if there exists

10 An undercover investigator offered to a target of investigation to buy 20 kg of cocaine with huge discount, explaining that as an employee of an air company he found the drugs in some solitary luggage. The target has never been involved in drug trafficking, but was persuaded to it by the tale of the huge profit he will make. The court made the decision that the victim was unlawfully led to commit crime (*entrapped*) – the case before American court *State v. Anders* (1992).





criminal liability, or instigation to crime, but it should not be taken into account when we talk about an investigating act in integrity testing. We underline once again that professional and personal integrity of a tested police officer has to be so strong that not even an unrealistically good opportunity must lead him to un-

lawful conduct in performing an official duty.

Conclusion: Simulated investigating activities, including integrity testing, make sense only in cases when they prove the guilt of those individuals who would commit the same or similar illicit act in a real situation!!!

## CONCLUSION

The analyses of police organizations worldwide confirm the attitude that they are full of possibilities to commit unlawful, corrupt behaviours – the powers which are exercised by their members are characterized by a wide range of discretions, they are pervaded with the possibility to apply coercion, they are often conducted in private spaces, out of sight of supervisors and in the presence of witnesses who are often considered unreliable. Traditional, repressive approach to crime suppression within the ranks of those who should guarantee respect of law has partly proven as inadequate for the problem. As in other spheres of *consensual crime* and so called *victimless crimes*, in case of repression of corruption in the police in the last twenty years the emphasis has been on application of proactive investigations, whereas a special accent is on the use of *integrity testing*.

Integrity can be tested for various purposes and in a wide range, from checking loyalty of an employee to the owner or director of the company where he works, to determining if a person performing a public office or has certain authorizations uses them in accordance with legal regulations. As an investigating method, today it is generally linked to the police and determining legality of conduct of their officers – testing is used

to determine their involvement in corruptive and other unlawful activities, but it also increases the general perception of risk that the employees can be caught in corruptive activity if they opt for it. In that regard, testing is most often conducted in those parts of the police which are in contact with citizens on a daily basis, such as traffic police, or in the sectors for which there is knowledge that they are particularly sensitive to corruption.

Integrity tests are one of modalities of simulated/pseudo deals, and thus secret operations with elements of simulation, and this is why in their realization it must take special care to avoid *encouragement*, in other words acting in the capacity of *agent provocateur*. It is conducted, almost as a rule, on a concrete person for whom there is information that in the course of their official engagement they violate legal norms which define and regulate them. Contrary to such targeted testing, integrity testing can be done randomly, on previously undetermined persons for whom there is not knowledge that they do illicit acts. However, the attitude of the majority of theorists and legislators is that the application of random integrity testing in the police should be avoided because of protection of freedoms and rights of the testees, and preservation of atmosphere



of collegiality and mutual trust within a police organization.

In the implementation of integrity testing special significance should be given to the questions of *initiation of illicit act* and *unrealistically good offer*, which are directly related to encouragement or prohibition of influence on the autonomous will of the testee in the process of making a decision if to commit an illicit act or not. According to our opinion, they are irrelevant when it comes to test-

ing of a police officer, which cannot be said also for simulated deals as a special proving activity. Such an attitude results from the fact that in integrity testing it is not an ordinary citizen who is tested, but a police officer, whose professional and personal integrity have to be so strong that not a proposal, not even persuasion or an extremely favourable opportunity to commit an illicit act must lead him to criminal behavior in performing an official duty.

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## COMMUNITY POLICING IMPLEMENTATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA: A VIEW FROM THE MANAGERS'S PERSPECTIVE

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**Abstract:** Activities aimed at bringing the police closer to the local community and promoting the building of partnerships and common solutions to security problems are referred to as community policing. In the Republic of Serbia, community policing implementation formally started in 2003 through the 'Community Policing' project. After the initial period of implementation, community policing principles were expected to become part of the organizational culture of police organization and a distinctive feature of everyday police practice. Based upon research results presented in this paper, the authors sought to determine to what extent the concept of community policing came to fruition in Serbian police practice and how it works today.

The research was directed towards the middle management of the Serbian police, where the sample included all regional police departments in Serbia. The paper concluded that at the time this research was conducted, community policing was not sufficiently implemented in the Serbian police practice, that reactive work still dominated over prevention and proactive work, the organizational structure did not allow greater representation of CP activities, there was a need for additional training of police officers and the legislation which could facilitate partnership between the police and the community was missing.

**Keywords:** police reform, crime prevention, partnership, community policing officers, problem solving, organizational changes.

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## INTRODUCTION

Evidence gathered showed that the reactive policing, based upon traditional law enforcement activities and tactics, have not been effective (Bayley, 1994). The focus of traditional policing is to respond to individual incidents rather than to address causes of these incidents (Goldstein, 1990). In order to control crime, police must act on the causes and conditions leading to its occurrence (Simonović, 2006). However, these causes and conditions are, as a rule, beyond the reach of police action, hence there is a need to mobilize other entities in community to jointly counter crime. When it was realized the police alone could not counter crime, and especially some factors affecting citizens' quality of life, it became clear that partnership with the community became an important element of exercising police function (Diamond & Weiss, 2009).

Police, citizens, and other entities in the local community have begun to cooperate and jointly address security concerns. These changes in police work marked the beginning of community policing. Community policing (hereinafter referred to as CP) represents a major change in policing practice that features shifting law enforcement's focus away from crime control (Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990; Diamond & Weiss, 2009). Since the inception of the CP, different definitions and practices have been associated with it (Young and Tinsley, 1998; Palmiotto, 2000; Brookes, 2006). Despite numerous definitions, three components are often emphasized, implying the existence of some consensus among academics and practitioners, when it comes to conceptualization of CP. These elements are: partnership between police and community, problem solving and organizational

transformation (Moore, 1992; Cordner, 1997; Maguire & Mastrofski, 2000; Skogan, 2004; Lorie, 2004; Gill et al., 2014).

If we take into account that many problems which require police attention arise and manifest themselves in the local community, then the establishment and maintenance of partnerships with the community is a prerequisite for the efficient police work. In the essence of such partnership is establishing and maintaining trust between police and community members – the goal that cannot be achieved overnight, but requires on-going effort and sustaining commitment (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994). Frequent contacts, mutual trust and strong partnership allow citizens and police officers to better understand each other, resulting in the increased respect and legitimacy of the police (Kelling, 1988) and safer communities.

Efforts intended to establish partnership will be doomed to failure if police do not allow citizens to have a voice in defining the problems and opportunity to participate in their solving. Hence the other CP 'pillar' – problem solving – is closely related to partnership. True partnership could not exist without expressing interest for community problems by the police. At the same time, if trying to identify and solve community problems police could not be effective enough acting on their own, without any community input and/or support. A community is believed to possess knowledge and resources, which can significantly contribute police officers' efforts, not only in preventing and solving crime (Moore et al., 2000), but to respond to a much wider array of problems that affect quality of life, which can sometimes raise greater



citizens concern than crime itself (Miller et al., 2008: 270).

By actively seeking public cooperation through increased contacts with citizens and exchange of information, the police can significantly enhance their ability to prevent crime (Moore et al., 2000). Crime prevention is central to the concept and ultimate goal of community policing (Skolnick & Bayley, 1988). Like traditional policing, where police is mostly engaged into responding to crime, CP emphasizes identification of the underlying conditions that lead to crime, before they grow into major crime problems. Hence, the extent to which crime prevention and problem solving activities are represented in police practice can be an important indicator of the quality of CP implementation in particular police organisation.

Treating citizens only as 'eyes and ears' is one way street police should not go. Even before community policing, police were aware of their dependence on community as a resource to solving crime (which is the primary focus of traditional model), citizens were never asked what had to be done in order to gain their help and support that exceeded merely crime reporting and/or providing suspect(s) description. It was thought that citizens' interest to live in a safer community was sufficient to motivate 'partnership' with police (Milić, 2017). It turned out that this was the wrong assumption and community policing was born on these and similar lessons learnt from the past.

In order to establish and maintain partnership police organisation must rely more on foot patrol, where officers should be put on permanent beats, so they are able to know residents and be aware of community safety issues (Cowell & Kringen, 2016). In order to facil-

itate problem solving, officers must be given the flexibility to handle problems in a way that they believe is most effective, rather than being constrained by rigid bureaucratic rules and procedures (Skogan et al., 1999). They need to have access to more information including greater support from crime analysis unit (Cordner & Biebel, 2005; Milic et al., 2017). These and other changes in police practice require restructuring of traditional, bureaucratic police organization. Although not necessary prerequisites to implement CP, decentralization and flattening of the layers of hierarchy may significantly facilitate CP implementation (Diamond & Weiss, 2009). Crime fighting should not be considered as 'the only' and 'the real' police work and that should be recognized, not only in the organization's mission statement, but in performance measurement system too. If there is no coherent message that activities which reflect community policing will be supported and rewarded, a change of behaviour will probably be missing.

In order for community policing to be successful, the system of recruitment, selection and training should also be changed. The police officers' selection process must take into account interpersonal skills, communication skills and problem-solving skills – skills that were often neglected under the traditional system. As CP brings changes to many areas of policing and requires some new skills, training and education become essential elements in the implementation of CP activities (Zhao et al., 1995; Haar, 2001). Without proper training, officers will be less likely to understand the philosophy of community policing and/or how to translate it into everyday practice (King & Lab, 2000). Research has consistently shown that progress made in



CP implementation, rarely was followed by changes in the way officers were trained – classes related to traditional crime-fighting strategies continued to dominate academy and field training curriculum, years after the inception of CP program (Chappell, 2009).

In the most European countries, the implementation of the CP began at the end of the last century, while in the Republic of Serbia, the implementation of this concept formally commenced in 2003 (Vojnović, 2004). The implementation process was divided into two phases. The first phase was the pilot phase in which the initial experience was gained in applying the new working method. In the second phase, numerous activities were undertaken in the field of establishing cooperation with local self-government

representatives. After the second phase, the Serbian police were supposed to undertake certain preventive activities in their daily work and implement prevention projects aimed at improving security at the local level.

Since CP inception, the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MOI) has been going through reform processes during which different attention has been paid to the CP activities. In that regard, this paper presents the results of research that was aimed to assess the extent to which partnership, problem solving and the existing organizational structure – as the three pillars of the CP – are represented in police practice, to identify problems which hinder CP implementation and to offer recommendations on how they can be overcome.

## **COMMUNITY POLICING IMPLEMENTATION IN SERBIAN POLICE – THE EMPIRICAL STUDY**

The research presented in this paper was conducted from March to June 2014, with the aim of assessing the quality of CP implementation, after a ten-year period of its implementation in the Serbian police practice, to identify the problems that hinder its implementation and to offer some recommendations for overcoming them. Particularly, the research sought to determine, from the (middle) management perspective, the

extent to which there is an orientation towards preventive police work, the extent to which the existing organizational structure is aligned to the needs of CP implementation, whether there is a need for additional training of police officers, to assess the community's readiness to cooperate with the police, as well as the extent to which strategic level of police management encourages and directs the CP activities.

## **SAMPLE AND RESEARCH METHOD**

The research was conducted between March and June 2014, through surveys and interviews. The survey questioned

359 police officers from all 27 police departments in Serbia. The respondents were heads within the regional police de-



partments<sup>2</sup> (chiefs of General Police Division, deputy chiefs, heads of section), heads within police stations (commanders, deputy and assistant commanders) and executive officers in the regional General Police Divisions.

More than half of the surveyed police officers, 188 (52.4%) of them, were heads

in a police station (commander, deputy, and assistant commander). The survey included 138 (38.4%) executive officers in the General Police Division/Department, as well as 33 (9.2%) heads in the Police Division/Department (chief, deputy chief, head of section) (Table 1).

**Table 1.** Overview of respondents (research sample) by position in the Ministry of Interior

RESEARCH SAMPLE					
Management level	Organisational unit	Teritorial responsibility	Position	Number of participants	
				Survey (N)	Inter-view (N)
STRATEGIC	Uniformed Police Department (Police Directorate)	Republic of Serbia	Head of Department for Prevention and Community Policing Activities	/	1
MIDDLE	General Police Divisions (26 regional PD) + General Police Department (Belgrade PD)	Region (3 + municipalities)	Head of General Police Division	33	/
			Deputy head		/
			Section chief		4
			Executive Officers (rank of police captain and above)	138	/
TACTICAL	Police station	1 municipality	Police station commander	188	/
			Deputy commander		/
			Assistant commander		/
			TOTOAL	359	5

The survey contained five questions about community policing. Answers to these questions are presented and analysed in this paper.

The largest number of respondents, 264 of them (73.5%) had more than 10 years

of service, which means that most of the respondents had the opportunity to (historically) assess the whole period from the beginning of CP implementation to the time when the survey was conducted (Table 2).

<sup>2</sup> All regional police departments, except Police Department for the City of Belgrade have General Police Division. Belgrade Police Department has General Police Department.






**Table 2.** Years of service of respondents in the Ministry of Interior

Years of service	N	%	Cumulative %
< 5	24	6,7	6,7
5-10	71	19,8	26,5
11-15	100	27,9	54,3
16-20	59	16,4	70,8
21-25	60	16,7	87,5
26-30	23	6,4	93,9
≥31	22	6,1	100

Police station heads (commander, deputy, and assistant commander) at the time of surveying had 5 to 15 years of work experience. Executive officers in the General Police Division/Department mostly had work experience of 11 to 15 years, while heads in the General Police Division/Department (chief, deputy chief, head of unit) at the time of surveying had 21 to 30 years of work experience in the Ministry of Interior (Figure 1).

The respondents differed statistically significantly by work experience in the Ministry of Interior and their respective position ( $\chi^2 = 32,634$ ;  $df = 12$ ;  $p = 0,001$ ).


**Figure 1.** Overview of respondents relative to their position and years of work experience

The collected data were entered into a specially created database for each respondent in *MS Excel*. After systemati-

zation and categorization of data, statistical data processing was performed using the IBM SPSS 20. Descriptive



statistics determined the frequency and percentage (N and %). Categorical variables were compared by the Chi-square test and the Fisher's exact test. Statistically significant value was estimated at the level of  $p < 0.05$ .

The interview was conducted with four middle level managers and one manager of the highest (strategic) level of the police organization. The interview was conducted with the heads of the *Section for Organization, Prevention, Training and Community Policing* in the regional police departments of Novi Sad, Kragujevac and Niš, as well as with the head

of the *Unit for Prevention and Community Policing* in the Police Department for City of Belgrade. These are the four largest and most security-laden police departments in Serbia. Finally, interview was conducted with the Head of the *Department for Prevention and Community Policing Activities* in the General Police Department, at the Police Directorate - department that supervises the CP implementation on the entire territory of Serbia. The interviewees had more than 10 years of experience, which is expected taking into account the positions they hold. Interviewees were asked to answer a total of 15 questions.<sup>3</sup>

## RESEARCH RESULTS

### *Survey results*

CP implementation was expected to make preventive work one of the basic contents in everyday police work. In an effort to verify the correctness of this attitude, the respondents were asked: *Are preventive activities represented in the police daily work?* Responding to this question, the largest number of respondents,

i.e. 310 (86.4%) of them, stated that preventive activities were not represented in the police daily work, while a smaller number of respondents, 49 (13.6%) of them, considered preventive activities were represented in the police daily work ( $\chi^2 = 189,752$ ;  $df = 1$ ;  $p = 0,000$ ) (Table 3).

<sup>3</sup> The respondents were asked the following questions: 1. Which jobs belong to your organizational unit competence? 2. What activities (measures and actions) are taken by your organizational unit in the field of community policing? 3. Have any preventative effects of community policing been achieved so far? 4. In which way does community policing function in your Police Division /Republic of Serbia today? 5. What problems are present today in the work of community policing, and how should current issues be addressed? 6. Are projects of problem-oriented community policing implemented at the PD/RS level? 7. Who initiates problem-oriented police work projects (police stations, Police departments/division, Police Division at the headquarters of the Police Directorate) and do they represent a real need to apply problem-oriented work or just a form? 8. Are police officers in the sector, sector leaders, and heads in police stations educated and trained for community policing? 9. In what way should community policing be organized in the Republic of Serbia? 10. Has Police Division at the Police Directorate headquarters communicated any guidelines for the implementation of the Community Policing Strategy? 11. Is it necessary to systematize a special organizational unit within the police station in charge only of prevention and community policing? 12. Are the subjects in the local community willing to cooperate with the police in taking preventive activities? 13. Can the current organization of community policing achieve preventive effects? 14. What changes in work are necessary to implement community policing? 15. Are preventive activities today represented in the daily work of the police? And if not, why is that so? At the end of the interview, the respondents were given the opportunity to express their opinion and make suggestions about improving community policing.



**Table 3.** Representation of preventive activities in the daily police work


	N	%	Significance #
Yes <sup>a</sup>	310	86,4	a/b***
No <sup>b</sup>	49	13,6	
Total	359	100	

# Chi-square test; \*\*\* p<0,001

It is interesting to analyse the structure of respondents' answers relative to their position and years of service in the Ministry of Interior (Figures 2 and 3).

Approximately the same percentage of the respondents who work as executive officers in General Police Division/Department (88.4%), and in the position of

a head in a police station (86.2%) believe that preventive activities are not represented in the daily work of the police. When it comes to heads in General Police Division/Department, a slightly lower percentage of the respondents (78.8%) agree with this view. This difference is statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 94,555$ ;  $df = 2$ ;  $p = 0,000$ ) (Figure 3).


**Figure 2.** Representation of preventive activities in the daily work of the police relative to the position respondents hold


Most of the respondents, regardless of their years of service, consider preventive activities are not represented in the daily work of the police. It is interesting that all, that is, 100% of respondents, who work in the Ministry of Interior for 26 to 30 years, believe that preventive

activities are not represented in the daily work of the police. A slightly smaller percentage of the respondents who have been working for over 30 years (90.9%) also consider preventive activities are not represented in the daily work of the police. Within subgroups of respondents



who answered YES ( $\chi^2 = 14.306$ ;  $df = 5$ ;  $p = 0.014$ ) and those who answered NO ( $\chi^2 = 87.419$ ;  $df = 6$ ;  $p = 0.000$ ) there is

a statistically significant difference depending on the length of service in the MoI (Figure 3).



**Figure 3.** Respondents' opinion on the representation of preventive activities depending on the years of service in the Serbian police

The respondents who answered negatively to the question were given the opportunity to comment on the reasons why preventive activities are not represented in the daily work of the police. Most of the respondents, 285 (79.4% of the total sample), who answered negatively to this question, believe that preventive activities are not represented because of the heavy workload of the police with numerous requests and orders issued from government bodies (e.g. Courts) the police are expected to handle, the lack of appreciation of preventive work results, the lack of obligation for preventive action, insufficient education on the CP work, strong repressive orientation of the police service, a small number of police officers in police stations, the lack of motivation of police officers and awareness of the importance of community policing (Plačkov 2008;

Milić, 2010; Đorović, 2011; Milidragović et al., 2019).

Problem-solving projects, with the emphasis on identification and addressing problems' root causes, are a way of solving security and other problems in the local community in a more sustainable way. In these projects, the police and the community, as partners, take part equally in problem solving, thus developing partnership and cooperation, as the key components of the CP concept. When it comes to practical implementation of these projects, the respondents were asked the following question: *Are projects of problem-oriented police work planned and implemented in your organizational unit (PD and PS)?* Responding to this question, the largest number of respondents, 221 (61.6%) of them, considered that projects were implemented only at the behest of higher levels of



management, while 58 (16.2%) of respondents claimed that no projects were implemented on an annual basis. Moreover, 71 (19.8%) respondents believe that several projects were implemented on one's own initiative during the year. The results of the answer to this question tell us that projects of problem-oriented work in police departments were occasionally realized, most often at the behest of higher levels of management.

Statistically viewed, a significant majority ( $p < 0.001$ ) of respondents believe that projects are implemented only by order of higher levels of police management, while those who claim that no project was implemented on an annual basis and those who did not write a response were a significant majority ( $p < 0.001$ ) (Table 4).

**Table 4.** *Representation of problem solving activities in the Serbian police practice*

	N	%	Significance #
Projects are implemented only by order of higher levels of management <sup>a</sup>	221	61,6	a/b,c,d***
Not a single project has been implemented on an annual basis <sup>b</sup>	58	16,2	b/d***
Several projects were implemented during the year, on own initiative <sup>c</sup>	71	19,8	c/b,d***
Not answered <sup>d</sup>	9	2,4	
Total	359	100	

# Chi-square test; \*\*\*  $p < 0,001$

CP implementation can also be carried out by specialized police officers whose only responsibility is community policing. Relieved from other activities, they are able to put more energy and commitment into CP activities than regular patrol officers. The countries where the CP work is organized in this way have recorded greater confidence of citizens in the police, better cooperation between them, reduction in crime rates and active participation of citizens in solving local problems (Forman, 2004; Feltes, 2013; Lobnikar et al., 2015:512). On the introduction of specialized community policing officers, the respondents were asked: *Is it necessary to establish com-*

*munity policing officer positions in police stations?* Responding to this question, 246 (68.5%) of respondents believe that community policing officer position in police stations should be systematized, 86 (24%) believe this is not necessary, while 26 (7.2%) of them said that police officers in the security sector are able to carry out tasks in the CP field on top of regular policing. More than half of the respondents believe that overload by regular tasks makes it impossible to undertake the activities within the scope of CP concept, which is why they consider it justified to systematize the community policing officer's position (Table 5).





**Table 5.** Systematization of the community policing officer's position

	N	%	Significance #
Yes <sup>a</sup>	246	68,5	a/b,c***
No <sup>b</sup>	86	24	b/c***
Police officers in the security sector are able to do community policing work in addition to regular policing tasks <sup>c</sup>	26	7,2	
Not answered	1	0,3	
Total	359	100	

# Chi-square test; \*\*\* p<0,001

Knowledge of police officers on CP philosophy and its importance, on the effects that can be achieved (increasing co-operation with citizens, reducing crime rates, etc.) is one of the most important conditions for CP implementation. It is a precursor to change of attitudes. Knowledge and skills about CP can only be gained through the police training and education, which is why the respondents were asked the following: *Do you think that your police department needs addi-*

*tional training of police officers in CP?* In response to this question, 275 (76.6%) of respondents said that additional training in CP of all police officers (chiefs, executive officers, commanders, sector heads and police officers in the security sector) was needed, 43 (12%) of them said that only front line police officers and sector heads need to be educated, while 39 (10.9%) respondents believed it was not necessary to educate police officers about the CP (Table 6).

**Table 6.** The need of additional training of police officers about community policing

	N	%	Significance #
Yes, there is a need for additional training for all police officers (chiefs, executive officers, commanders, sector heads and police officers in the security sector) <sup>a</sup>	275	76.6	a/b,c***
There is no need for additional training related to CP <sup>b</sup>	39	10,9	
There is a need for additional training only for front line police officers and sector heads <sup>c</sup>	43	12	
Not answered	2	0,5	
Total	359	100	

# Chi-square test; \*\*\* p<0,001

CP implementation has also resulted in organizational adaptation of the police organization. Within the Uniformed Police Department at the Police Direc-

torate and within the Uniformed Police Department for the City of Belgrade new organizational units for crime prevention and community policing were



established. Regional police departments have envisaged executive officers' positions for the CP (rank of captain and above). Within the police stations there were neither special organizational unit for CP nor special positions (e.g. CP officers) for performing these tasks. In order to determine the functionality of this model of organization, we asked the respondents the following: *How functional is the current model of police organisation for performing preventive and repressive tasks?* When asked, 75% of the respond-

ents said that the current model of the police organizational structure was not functional for exercising the preventive and repressive function of the police. A smaller number of the respondents, 68 out of 359 (19%), stated that the current model of the police organizational structure was functional for exercising preventive and repressive function, and for 21 (6%) respondents the present model was effective only for repressive action (Table 7).

**Table 7.** *Functionality of police organization's structure*

	N	%	Significance #
It is not functional for the fulfilment of the preventive-repressive function of the police <sup>a</sup>	270	75	a/b,c***
It is functional for the fulfilment of the preventive-repressive function of the police <sup>b</sup>	68	19	b/c***
It is functional for repressive activities only <sup>c</sup>	21	6	
Total	359	100	

# Chi-square test; \*\*\* p<0,001

### Interview results

The interviewees were asked a total of 15 questions. The questions were grouped into sections related to the competence of the organizational units managed by the respondents, activities undertaken and preventive effects achieved in CP, the existing problems, the cooperation with the local community and the changes necessary to improve CP implementation.

The respondents from the regional police departments of Novi Sad, Niš and Kragujevac headed the *Section for Organization, Prevention, Training and Community Policing*. As it is evident from the section's title, the responsibilities of this Section included other tasks

apart from the prevention and CP. In the mentioned regional police departments, CP policing positions established in the mentioned Sections were not filled or the officers who were assigned to these positions performed other tasks, at the behest of the department manager. Police officers at the *Department for Prevention and Community Policing* in the Police Department for the City of Belgrade did not perform tasks within the competence of the department at all; instead they performed tasks related to internal affairs control. *The Department for Prevention and Community Policing* at the Uniformed Police Department in Police Directorate conducted tasks within its competence.



The respondents stated that since the period of initial implementation of the CP in the Republic of Serbia, certain activities were undertaken, among which the most important were: lectures in schools, holding of forums and implementation of several projects of problem-oriented police work and daily visits to the policing sectors. In regional police departments, CP projects were implemented only at the level of the police department, not at the local level, that is, the level of police stations. These projects were rare - one or no project per year. According to the interviewees, the activities undertaken in the regional police departments did not yield any significant preventive effects, nor did they increase the citizens' trust in the police. However, significant preventive effects were achieved in schools, by introducing the work of school police officers, implementing the projects "School without Drugs and Violence", "Safe Childhood - Development of a Safety Culture of Youth", "Stop Peer Violence" and they were manifested through the reduction of crimes and misdemeanours in and around schools.

Talking about the problems that made the CP concept implementation difficult, the respondents said the most pronounced are the lack of safety councils in municipalities, the lack of awareness among police officers about the importance of prevention and community po-

licing, police overload with other tasks, the lack of citizens' trust in the police and the lack of financial resources for the implementation of projects of problem-oriented police work. Some respondents felt that additional training was not required for police officers to perform these tasks, and their response was not substantiated by facts that would clarify this further.

The cooperation of police and representatives of local communities has been reduced mainly to contacts on various bases, without their involvement in solving any security problem. In order to involve all local community entities in solving security problems, the respondents emphasized that first the obligation of cooperation of local community entities with the police should be regulated by law, and second, that the local community leaders and all entities should be educated on the importance of CP and its effects. The respondents also pointed out that Security Councils, whose tasks should be regulated by law, should play a key role in establishing co-operation and initiating prevention in the local community.

All respondents agree on the need for a different organization of the CP implementation. They believed that establishing community policing officer position should be considered and that a special organizational unit (unit or section) for CP should be established in police stations and regional police departments.

## **RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION**

After more than a decade since its inception into police practice, CP should have been a daily routine for police work. However, the results of the presented research are not encouraging. They tell us

that preventive police activities are not only lacking in the daily routine of policing, but are also a rarity.

Analysing the results of the presented research, we can conclude that the lack



of representation of the CP was influenced by several factors, among which the most important are the following: dysfunction of the police organizational structure, deep-rooted repressive model of police work, the lack of knowledge of police officers about the importance and models of community policing concept implementation, the lack of constant education and legally non-binding police and community collaboration (the work of Security Councils).

The beginning of police reform aimed at implementing the CP was accompanied by certain organizational changes. New police organizational units have been formed in the police organizational structure. Within the Uniformed Police Department at the Police Directorate, as well as within the Police Department for the City of Belgrade, a *Department for Prevention and Community Policing* was established. In the regional police departments within the *Section for the Organization, Prevention, Training and Community Policing in Police Departments*, executive officer positions (rank of captain and above) for community policing have been established. This organizational change should have created the foundations for further development and implementation of the CP concept. The new organizational units in the Police Departments and the position of executive CP officers inside regional police departments were to be the initiators and carriers of CP activities in the police departments. However, this did not happen. The *Department for Prevention and Community Policing* in the Police Department for the City of Belgrade did not perform the tasks for which it had been formed, but the tasks related to the internal affairs. The situation was similar with officers in regional police departments. In some regional

police departments, the positions of the executive CP officers were vacant, while in other regional police departments, the officers in these positions performed other tasks. The tasks of the *Department for Prevention and Community Policing* of the Uniformed Police Departments in Police Directorate and the tasks of the executive CP officers in the regional police departments are managerial in their nature. Taking specific preventive activities and tasks in the area of CP was within the competence of the local police stations, whose responsibilities also included other police activities, such as detecting and solving crimes, maintaining law and order, securing public gatherings, handling requests and orders issued by state subjects (e.g. courts), etc. Police officers at police stations were expected to perform all these tasks and to achieve satisfactory results in all these activities. However, in practice, the situation is somewhat different, a large number of orders, requests and warrants issued by state subjects, frequent engagement of police officers in securing public gathering and other manifestations, the achievement of satisfactory repressive results, caused CP activities to be put to the background or completely neglected. According to it, at the very beginning of the CP implementation into the Serbian police, a mistake was made, which was reflected in non-separating the CP work into a separate organizational unit at the Police Directorate headquarters, regional police departments and police stations (specialization). In literature specialization is often stated as an important factor in CP implementation (Greene et al., 1994; Herbert, 1998; Carter & Radelet, 1999; Feltes, 2002; Adams et al., 2005; Namgung, 2018). In this way, the CP work would be separated from other police affairs and would be





carried out in separate organizational units of the police. Thus, specialized CP units in police stations would be able to carry out daily tasks in the field of CP without being distracted by other police activities. The performance of these organizational units would be measured by the number and content of activities implemented and the preventive effects achieved. Otherwise, the assignment of community policing activities to only a few police officers in police stations poses a real threat for these activities to be neglected, due to their frequent engagement in performing other tasks. For example, this was the case with the officers in the regional police departments and with the entire organizational unit in Police department for the City of Belgrade whose top responsibility was CP implementation. In countries with deep rooted traditional (reactive) police orientation, sometimes this could be the only way for CP implementation. Such a “specialized” approach should be, at some point in the future, replaced with “generalized” approach. Otherwise CP will not be truly implemented. Namely, the idea of CP specialization is not in accordance with the CP philosophy posing a great threat to “smother” it in a long term. By its nature CP philosophy implies a ‘whole of organisation’ approach because its principles should permeate activities of all police officers (Mastrofski, 2006). According to (Young and Tinsley, 1998) “if problem-solving and responsibility for crime prevention are assigned to specialised units without fundamental change in the rest of policing, the predominant philosophy and culture of the organisation will almost inevitably remain unchanged”. At the same time, as it is noted by (Moore, 1992) “the creation of specialized units committed to community policing strat-

egies may signify that “only” (added by the authors) officers in the units are mainly responsible for the implementation of diverse community policing programs”. Not being able to be transformed into effective mainstream policing, CP may gradually disappear in the years to come.

In addition, performance measurement system still neglects CP activities. Crime prevention and other activities related to CP are either not valued at all, or in cases when they are taken into account during performance evaluation(s), they are less valued in comparison to other (reactive) activities.

The dominant orientation of the police towards the traditional way of work is also influenced by the lack of knowledge of police officers (not only front line police officers, but police managers too) about the importance of prevention and the modalities of CP implementation in practice. The requirement for the deployment of police officers to senior positions in police stations and senior management levels was not the possession of certificates about passing the exam for a head, which would cover legal subjects, leadership in the police, criminal justice, crime prevention, the work of the CP and the like. Instead, the requirement was simply to have a university degree in social science and a certain number of years of work experience. Thus, police officers whose education background was not achieved from police educational institution (e.g. University of Crime Investigation and Police Studies in Serbia), i.e. faculties that do not have any subject related to the criminal justice and/or police profession in their curricula, were assigned to management positions (Simonović, 2015). It should be added that these heads were not obliged





to further develop their knowledge in the above-mentioned fields, which made their knowledge on crime prevention and the work of CP either lacking or at the level of general knowledge.<sup>4</sup>

Modern police work aimed at prevention, unlike traditional police work, requires police officers to have different array of knowledge and skills that can only be acquired and upgraded through education and training. For this reason, continuous education of all police officers on CP is important, which is agreed by the largest number of the respondents. The lack of education moves police officers away from prevention and community policing and returns them to traditional policing. The beginning of the CP implementation was accompanied by the relevant training of police officers. Leaders of different ranks (commanders, deputies and assistant commanders of the police station) and front line police officers participated in these trainings. During these trainings, police officers acquired basic or informative knowledge of CP, which was not sufficient for the long-term implementation of this type of practice. After the initial implementation period there was no continuation of CP training in the police departments (e.g. no refresher trainings were offered).

Training of police officers is mostly needed when changes in police work are introduced, as was the case with the introduction of the CP concept. However, its significance is not lower later, when the newly established system needs to be maintained. New training should extend basic knowledge about the prevention and CP work. The training of police officers on crime prevention and CP should positively influence the change

in their views and opinions on the need and importance of prevention and CP. Otherwise, the acquired knowledge and changed awareness could soon be lost and the police will continue with the traditional way of working, as the only learned work.

There is no effective police work without prevention and there is no prevention without partnership and cooperation with the local community. The respondent from the City of Belgrade Police Department, answering the question about cooperation with the local community, i.e. with the heads in municipalities in the city of Belgrade, said that some heads cooperated with the police in prevention and provided every kind of help and support, while others refused any form of cooperation because they were not bound by any legal act. Cooperation was upon the goodwill of local community heads (Milidragović, 2016: 167). Hence, cooperation between the police and local community representatives should not be based on goodwill and/or motivated with some political interests, but on the legal obligation to cooperate and form local security councils and other bodies, as well as to designate specific financial resources for the implementation of problem solving projects in the municipal budget. In this way, the problem of establishing cooperation between the police and the local community, the absence of local security councils and the lack of financial resources for the implementation of projects would be overcome, as the respondents also pointed out.

Unlike other similar researches, according to the authors' knowledge, this research is the only one in Serbia that entailed all 27 regional police departments. Apart from similar researches

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<sup>4</sup> This practice was discontinued with the adoption of the new Police Act 2016.



whose focus was on the attitudes of front line police officers, the present research focused on the middle management, particularly to those managers whose, if not the only then the most dominant responsibility was CP implementation. Interview conducted in this research also entailed a strategic manager (Police Directorate level) who was in charge of CP implementation in Serbia. This research would be of better quality if it had included police officers from other lines of police work, primarily members of the criminal police. Although they are on the streets daily and interact with the citizens (whose information often plays a crucial role in their crime solving efforts), there is an erroneous belief that they should not have any role when it comes to the

CP implementation. Usually they are exempted from any CP reform, not only in Serbia but in other countries too. The same can be applied to traffic police and some other police branches. In that regard, knowledge of how they view the CP and what their role, if any, should be in its implementation, remains as the idea for some future research. Finally, just as there is no community-free CP, so no CP-related research could provide a complete picture if it does not include citizens. It would be interesting to see how community members evaluate police CP activities, if the police can be considered as a reliable partner, what they miss when it comes to CP policing and what message they would have to send to the police management.

## CONCLUSION

Since the inception of CP in the Serbian police practice, numerous scientific papers and evaluations indicated the problems, mistakes and weaknesses related to the implementation of this concept, some of them offering suggestions and guidelines how to overcome them (Kešetović, 2003; Mellish & Đurđević, 2004; Vuković, 2004; Simonović, 2004; Downes, 2004; Ryan, 2005; Kešetović & Davidović 2007; Ivetić, Mladjović, 2016). Although the examples of good practice are highlighted too, their general conclusion is that CP activities were insufficiently represented in the Serbian police practice – the conclusion also supported by the findings presented in this paper.

According to this research, the main impediments to greater CP implementation are: (1) predominantly repressive orientation of the police service. In the case where strong reactive orientation

exists, CP activities are neglected; (2) Organizational structure which is not able to provide greater CP involvement through specialization.; (3) The lack of knowledge and skills related to CP concept; (4) The lack of legislation which could facilitate cooperation between the police and the community.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, when the CP implementation in the Republic of Serbia formally started, the periods when this concept was neglected were superseded by the periods when it was publicly proclaimed as one of the (strategic) priorities in the police work. Changes of police leadership, the lack of resources, the resistance of traditional police subculture that prefers crime fighting, the lack of community involvement etc., are just some factors that could divert Serbian MoI from the CP principles. However, commitment to



CP implementation has survived to this day. Recently, the specialized police officers were introduced to all police stations. During the last decade, growing demands for calls for service, coupled with increasing paperwork (bureaucracy), left little time to CP activities. Introduction of specialized CP officers, whose sole responsibility is CP implementation, seems to be the only way for getting forward in the current constellation. A clearly defined scope of their work should be followed by allowing them greater discretion, accompanied with strict responsibility for the results achieved. This should further initiate changes to the performance appraisal system, where more value is put to activities and/or results related to problem solving and partnership building. The police officers' selection process should pay attention to skills such as analytical thinking and interpersonal communication which are nowadays neglected. Finally, there is a need for caution in order not to create animosity between "CP officers" and others in the police organization, by emphasizing daily communication and information exchange. The police leadership at the strategic level should send clear messages that the long-term goal of Serbian police is that entire police organization (not only uniformed patrol branch) adopts and acts according to the CP principles.

Winning "hearts and minds" of police officers and community members about the importance of the CP principles is an essential factor for its implementation. Police organizations should maintain constant education and training of police officers on the importance of the CP as well as to developing skills that are necessary in its daily implementation. At the same time, the benefits of police-community partnerships should be promoted in the (social) media. Police-community cooperation should be the subject of normative regulation, which will regulate clear obligations related to establishment and responsibilities of security councils, provision of funding for CP projects, etc.

Finally, we can state that with the introduction of CP police officers, a significant step has been made towards CP implementation. The mere introduction of specialized police officers, without affecting other problems, some of them already mentioned in this paper, will not guarantee sustainable CP implementation in the Serbian police. Ultimate goal should be focused on changing the organizational culture in a way it should become more conducive to CP. Otherwise specialized CP officer will be quickly "swallowed" by the rest of organization and CP in the Serbian police will continue to live a quiet life, where the CP activities will be, not a rule, but an exception.

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## THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE CONCEPT OF A ‘PUBLIC SERVANT’ TOWARDS A COMMON DEFINITION<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract:** The public law theorists have been attempting to determine the meaning of the concept of ‘public servant’ on the basis of various criteria. The existing theoretical views often reflect the dynamics of administrative development of individual countries, which directly affects the status and the role of a public servant. Given the lack of a ‘universal definition’, the objective of this paper is to point to the diverse theoretical definitions of the notion of the public servants, which are often associated with the role and characteristics of an individual country’s public administration, legal tradition, and political and social system. Notwithstanding the existing theoretical differences, the paper also aims to establish the common and essential elements of the concept of a public servant, which transcend the national differences. Although the theoretical concept of the public servants offered by legal science often relies on a definition of positive law, the divergences of scientific opinions keep shaping the normative reality as well.

**Keywords:** public servant, public administration, general interest, theoretical understanding.

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## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Public servants play a crucial part in carrying out the administrative activities in every country (Stjepanovic, 1958). They have a key role in both formulating and implementing government policies. In addition to this, they have an obligation to devote their entire capacities to their employer for the purpose of achieving public interest and implementing parliamentary decisions in a neutral and equal way, in accordance with principles of loyalty, life-long tenure and a career-based system. As representatives of the state, they are also obliged to be trustworthy and demonstrate decent and respectful behaviour (SIGMA, 2018: 369).

Identifying a 'universal' definition of the public servant across different legal systems, or in the same legal system over different periods of time, appears to be an impossible task. It is difficult to believe that the meaning of this notion can ever be fully agreed upon by all authors. Although defining the concept of a public official has theoretical and practical significance, the existing variations in its interpretation are understandable, as they are based on particularities of the period and the society analysed (Vukašinović Radojičić, 2013:12). For this reason, some administrative law theorists attempted to define the concept of a public official starting from legal, political, and other criteria.

Theoretical considerations of a term public servant are often based on the conceptions of the status and role of public administration in a society. In the model where the public administration is perceived as an apparatus of state power, set up with the main goal to 'exercise administrative power', the concept of the public servant is somewhat narrow, as it inclu-

des only employees who exercise administrative powers. In the modern public administration systems, however, where the public administration is perceived as an organization with a social function of providing public services to citizens, the concept of a public servant is much broader, as it includes all employees who provide services to the citizens. New public administration systems in modern countries emerge and rest on the modified needs and motivation of citizens as beneficiaries of the public administration services (Kavran, 2003: 23).

Positive legislation in many countries defines a concept of a public servant in a narrow or broader way, depending on the legal status of the officials and the nature of civil servants' employment relationship provided by the law. Henceforth, many authors have started their discussions on a concept of public servants by arguing that a concept of a public official cannot be examined separately from the social environment, and outside the general social context (Kostić, 1933; Krbek, 1948; Stjepanović, 1958). The concept of a public servant, in their view, largely depends on the understanding of the concept of state and public administration, the organization and structure of the administrative system, functions and tasks, decentralization, (de)politicization, legal tradition, political system and social environment. Although many of the legal theorists have tried to identify common values of the concept of a public servant, the discussion on the universal features of this concept has not ended with a tangible result.

Similar to the concept of a civil servant or public administration, the concept of a public servant cannot be fully un-



derstood just by relying on a positivist approach, i.e. individual countries legal and political context. If we do not find a common theoretical understanding of this concept, the possibility of the use of the term 'public servant' in both theoretical discussions and comparative research will be greatly limited.

The objective of this paper is to analyse the understanding of the concept of a public servant in the domestic and foreign literature and to try to establish its common essential elements. In order to achieve these goals, the authors take into account the following assumptions:

- 1) Discussions and understandings of the role of the state in a society;
- 2) Views of public law theorists on what constitutes a concept of a 'public servant';
- 3) Absence of tendencies to set a 'universal' definition of the concept of public servant;

4) Different notions of public administration in different or the same legal systems;

5) Defining the concept of a public servant depending on legal, political, and social conditions;

6) Theorists' efforts to identify key features (substance) of the public servants' relationship with the state.

Drawing on the above-mentioned objectives and assumptions, the structure of paper shall contain three key parts: 1) the analysis of the current theoretical understanding of the concept of a public of a public servant, 2) an attempt to define universal values of a concept of a public servant, 3) the thoughts and conclusions about the above formulations in aiming to inspire further discussion on the development of this important concept.

## DIVERGING VIEWS OF THE CONCEPT OF A PUBLIC SERVANT IN THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL SCIENCE

The concept of a public servant emerged with the creation of a modern constitutional monarchy. As Baltić explains, "in the modern state, the official ceases to be a vassal to feudal lords or a personal servant to the absolutist German dukes or the French and English kings, and becomes a public functionary, a servant to many rather than merely to the monarch, a public servant" (Baltić, 139: 8).

Weber was one of the first legal theorists who depicted the concept of a public servant. According to Weber, "administrative apparatus is composed of the officials who are obedient to objective official duties, appointed by strict hierarchy, with strictly set competences in the service, on the basis of professional qualifi-

cations that are tested by examinations and confirmed by diplomas, and who receive salary for their work, the level of which depends primarily on the hierarchical rank and responsibility required by the specific position. A typical 'bureaucratic' official is one practicing it as his/her principal vocation" (Weber, 1976: 173-175). Similarly to Weber's understanding, N. Visković refers to public servants as bureaucrats – persons who professionally, permanently under the general norms, discharge administrative functions rather than make political decisions (Visković, 1997:42).

An earlier administrative law theorist, N. Cavallieri also stressed that the role of the public servant is to serve the





state in a professional and permanent manner. He held that “an official of the state is anyone who takes on the obligation to put his knowledge and skill to the service of the state with a compensation from the state budget so as to perform the service as a career to which he has permanently committed him/herself” (Cavallieri, 1911: 7). In a similar way, S. Jovanović pointed out that “the official's whole person is preoccupied with public service, he is converted into a body of a foreign state person and working for that person as his main, if not the only calling” (Jovanović, 1922: 422). By analysing the official's role, in his work *On the State*, in Chapter 62 titled *The Officials*, Jovanović defines the public servants as persons who are bound by public law contracts to permanently serve the state and who differ from persons bound by private law contracts (Jovanović, 2011: 477).

A. Baltić viewed public servants as persons who ‘clearly stand out from all other servants’ (Baltić, 1939: 28). He provided a definition of the general notion of public servants from the perspective of substantive law, thus defining the public servants as ‘persons who are voluntarily and in a permanent manner (in relative terms) incorporated into permanent and predetermined official posts or official ranks in the permanent public services staff, receiving a salary fixed by law or regulations from the budget’ (*Ibidem*). From this definition the following essential elements of the public servants’ employment relationship are derived: public service, voluntary acceptance of service, functions or ranks, continuity of staff, salary, and other. The idea of staff permanence in public administration is associated with the necessity to incorporate public servants in operation of public administration to enable its continuous and uninterrupted functioning.

The incorporation, of course, does not mean an organic incorporation – the officials are not organically connected with public authorities, they do not form their parts; instead, it relates to their inclusion in the permanent administrative staff, thus simultaneously making them operationally and functionally linked to particular posts, where they regularly and permanently perform a particular function (Baltić, 1961: 57).

L. Kostić departed from the view that a public servant in the broadest sense denotes any person who performs a job for the state, even temporarily (Kostić, 1933: 270). In his opinion, public servants form a category of employees classified under the permanent staff; they are permanent officials or career officials, and “their tenure is permanent and life-long”.

N. Stjepanović introduced special legal regime as a *differentia specifica* of the term public servant in comparison to other categories of employees. Stjepanović relied on the definitions laid down in positive law regulations and argues that “a public servant is a person who performs public service tasks in public authorities and independent institutions as his/her regular occupation”, whereby by ‘public service’ he assumes the activity ensuring the performance of functions of general interest to the society and other public functions (Stjepanović, 1958: 316). He also points out that the term ‘official, i.e. a person in an official capacity’ encompasses both public servants and functionaries, while ‘employees’ assume persons who carry out the administrative and technical functions that ensure the exercise of public authorities’ powers (Stjepanović, 1958:346).

P. Dimitrijević defined public servants as persons in an official capacity, who perform tasks and functions of relevant



administrative bodies on a permanent basis (Dimitrijević, 1983: 174).

Another author drawing on the view that public servants are career servants performing public services as their regular and main occupation is Ivo Krbek, who held that “career public servants are available at all times to provide services of a particular profession, in which they move and relocate” (Krbek, 1948: 30). As I. Krbek pointed out, one should bear in mind that “the real interest of the service has a primacy over the servant’s personal interest and that legal order grants certain rights to the officials in order for them to deliver the best possible service” (*Ibidem*). This author further held that “essential thing to thoroughly define a person in the public service of the state, in the broad sense, is precisely that this person acts on behalf of a particular public authority, that his/her activity is considered to be the activity of the particular public authority” (Krbek, 1948:7).

Other authors use slightly different terminology when defining the persons working in the public interest. R. Marković referred to the definition of ‘civil servants’ as “persons who perform duties within public administrative authorities as their permanent and regular occupation, as their profession (in contrast to elected and appointed persons)” (Marković, 2002: 171). Z. Tomić defines the term ‘administrative officials or administrative staff’, as “a plurality of persons who work in public administrative authorities (and in other related authorities and organizations), including the heads of those authorities” (Tomić, 2009: 157). E. Pusić held that political functionaries could also be professionals, but only as politicians rather than experts for the administrative organizations in which

they discharge their political functions (Pusić, 2002: 205).

Due to the drawbacks of the organizational and functional approach, which are usually used to define the concept of a public administration and subsequently the public servants, a method being increasingly used to define the concept of a public official is one of ‘combination’, which starts from the form of organization – of the bodies and organizations in which the officials work and the functions – the affairs of public importance. Thus, for example, E. Pusić held that identifying the public administration with the exercise of power makes a public servant “a holder of a portion of the state’s monopoly of coercion, or a holder of authorities that derive directly from this monopoly” (Pusić, 1973:176). In attempting to define this concept, taking into account functional and organizational criteria, this author determined the concept of a public servant according to the function he/she discharges and the respective authorities and organizations in which he/she works (Pusić, 1973: 165-170). I. Borković viewed a public servant as a person, designated or appointed to a particular post within a public administrative body, who participates in the exercise of public power, in line with his/her professional qualifications, in a professional manner as his/her permanent occupation (Borković, 1999: 48).

The French administrative science also had an important role to play in defining the concept of a public servant. Given the traditional importance of the provision of public services, public servants in France (*fonctionnaires*) have always enjoyed a privileged position. In the works of French theorists, the central element of public services provision is acting in a general interest. At the outset



of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the concept of administration changed and expanded, from an organisation which exercises public authority to an organisation which provides public services. The term 'public service' makes its first appearance, to replace the concepts of public authority, sovereignty, state's right to command. General interest has become the central element of a public service. Thus, for example, Laubadere argued that "public service means any activity aimed to satisfy the general interest of the society" (Laubadere, 1953: 40). Duguit has further emphasised, in the spirit of his solidaristic conception of the state and law, that the state and law are not mere instruments in the hands of the ruling class, but an organisation with a goal to pursue the interests of society as a whole. He held that the main task of the state underwent a transformation at the beginning of the 20th century, from the exercise of public authority to the exercise of public services (Duguit, 1929: 32-33). In his view, the public servants are those employees who participate in the functioning of the public service (Duguit, 1930: 4).

The French administrative law science further attempted to define the term 'public sector employees' through an assignment of a special legal regime to this category of staff (Nezard, 1901; Berlemy 1930; Plantez, 1991). The status of public servants is subject to public law rules, with civil service disputes falling within the jurisdiction of administrative courts. The French system assigns the attribute 'servant' to those persons who discharge authoritative functions and enforce governmental acts, while being appointed by public law acts (Jeze, 1926: 2). In Jeze's view, any person who even temporarily engages in the exercise of

public functions should have the status of a public servant (Jeze, 1930: 241).

Modern German administrative law scientists define the concept of a public servant (*Beamte*) by analysing the key features of their legal status. Thus, for example, Reichard and Rober claim that typical characteristics of public servants are continuity of employment, right to salary, impartiality, political neutrality, commitment to public service, limited right to strike, and application of special disciplinary rules (Reichard, Rober 2010: 3). The status of public servants is characterised by a long period of preparation and training before entering into employment, public servants tenure, clearly defined career development, appropriate compensation for work and, above all, loyalty and commitment to the public interest (Rabrenović 2011: 240). Given that Germany has a strong tradition of adherence to laws and other regulations (*'Rechtsstaat'*), some authors stress the dominance of the lawyers' profession in the public service, so-called *juristen-monopol* (Derlien, Hans-Ulrich 1991: 385). Officials often resist frequent changes and advocate the sustainability of the existing rules and procedures. They are primarily 'in the service' of the state, as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon model where the principle of the New Public Management has prevailed, with the focus on service delivery to customers, efficiency of the administration, and alike.

The British administrative law science also underlies the importance of defining the term public servant. In Wade's opinion, public servants (*Public Officers, Public Employees*) in Great Britain are "persons who perform governmental functions" and whose status is subject to the public law regime (Wade, 2004: 68). While some authors start from the



criterion of 'organizational structure and policy implementation' (Fletcher, 1967: 53-54), others regard as the key criterion for defining the concept of public servants the nature of duties that they perform (Dunleavy, 1982: 215; Greenwood, Wilson, 1993: 4). Most theorists point out that the public servants have a duty to assist the Government with integrity, honesty, impartiality, and objectivity, irrespective of the political complexity of formulating policies. Meny and Knapp view the public servants as the subordinates, because they follow and implement political decisions (Meny, Knapp, 1998: 267).

Over the past few decades, the joint OECD and EU programme SIGMA,<sup>3</sup> has had an important role in defining the concept of a public servant in Europe. In SIGMA's view, public servants are defined as officials exercising managerial, decision-making or implementation functions or entrusted with particularly important tasks within the public administration bodies (SIGMA, 1997).

They need to be subject to a set of special legal conditions, which would enable them to effectively discharge their duties and functions, in a lawful and proper manner (SIGMA 1999: 22). These legal conditions assume "rights and duties, professional stability, protection from political encroachment and from the interference from lobbies, adequate level of salary in order to reduce the likelihood of corruption, disciplinary provisions, and selection based on merit" (SIGMA, 1999). SIGMA especially stresses the importance of merit-based recruitment and promotion, which assumes a selection of the best suitable candidates available for the civil service, and preventing patronage in the staffing of public administration. SIGMA views regarding the human resources management and public service have been further developed in the document "Principles of Public Administration", which currently serve as a basis for assessing the readiness of the EU candidate countries in the EU accession process (SIGMA, 2014).

### UNIVERSAL VALUES: KEY FEATURES OF THE CONCEPT OF A PUBLIC SERVANT

The absence of a universal concept of a public servant necessitates a discussion on the generic features of this notion. Bearing in mind the earlier presented theoretical discussions, the character and structure of public administration, and the nature and importance of functions discharged by public servants, key characteristics of a concept of a public servant, in our view, include the following elements:

- 1) Acting in public interest. If we approach defining the concept of a public servant from the functional (substantive) aspect, the key criterion is the content of the function he/she discharges, regardless of the organizational form of work. According to the functional criterion, public servants are persons who perform tasks of public importance;
- 2) Working in the organizational units of public administration – public authori-

<sup>3</sup> SIGMA - Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European Countries — is a joint initiative of the OECD and the European Union. The initiative supports public administration reform efforts in thirteen countries in transition, and is principally financed by the European Union's Phare Programme.





ties, non-public entities, and all holders of 'public authorities'. Organizationally, the defining factor of the concept of a public servant is the organisation where a public servant works, i.e. - public administration authorities (Vukašinović Radojičić, 2015: 39). Public servants are hence persons performing duties within public administration authorities and organizations. How wide the notion of the public official will be defined in an individual country will depend on the organization of public administration in that country;

3) Continuity/permanence of employment and professionalism in carrying out their work. Public servants are expected to perform their duties on a permanent basis and as a regular occupation, based on pre-set rights, duties and responsibilities, adhering to the rules of the profession and acting in a politically neutral manner. Given that "the administrative activity of the state can only be efficient when people carrying out those tasks are sufficiently capable, active, loyal, and honest" (Stjepanović, 1958: 315), the feature of permanent and professional discharge of administrative functions is an essential one to the concept of a public servants. Professionalism of public servants is to be secured through several elements: recruitment and selection based on merit, promotion based on performance and competences; providing opportunities for career development; and competitive levels of salary to ensure staff retention and motivation (Rabrenović, 2019: 27). Closely related to the principle of professionalism is the principle of depoliticization of public administration, which assumes establishing mechanisms to prevent political influence on the work of the servants, especially those on higher managerial positions (SIGMA, 2014: 50).

4) Special accountability arrangements for their actions. Public servants enjoy special rights and decision-making powers, which need to be balanced with strengthened accountability for their actions. For this reason, the behaviour of public servants is testable through administrative law either via administrative supervision or through judicial review (e.g. administrative courts). The behaviour of public servants can also be sanctioned via disciplinary law, leading to strong compliancy, procedural focus and an administrative culture with strong emphasis on preventing errors or mistakes (European Commission, 2018: 369);

5) Special legal regime in order to secure public servants professionalism and accountability. The status of public servants is governed by regulations establishing a regime different from the market principles applicable in the private sector, in order to secure the professionalism in their work and accountability for their actions. Regulation by law of the public servants' relationship provides various guarantees, but also establishes their accountability. Despite the popularity of criticising the over-emphasis on laws and rules in contemporary public services and the calls to reduce bureaucracy, rules and administrative burdens, the primacy of law, including the area of the status of public servants, is likely to remain in the future (Demmke, 2010: 9);

6) Changing role throughout time. As we could see from the work of earlier public law theorists, the role of public servants was primarily to comply with the existing rules, regulations and procedures (Weber, 1976: 173-175). This role, however, has been constantly changing, as public servants are faced with more complex tasks, which require flexibility in their work and continuous professi-





onal development. Public servants are faced with change, often very a rapid one, and need to respond to them in an efficient and effective manner, with the focus on their performance results. At

the same time they have to make more autonomous decisions, be more responsible, accountable and acquire new skills and competencies (Demmke, 2010: 9).

**Table 1.** *Key features of a concept of a public servant*

1. Acting in a public interest (functional aspect)	2. Working in an organisation of public administration (organisational aspect)
3. Permanence of employment and professionalism (merit based recruitment and selection, career development, etc.)	4. Accountability through disciplinary sanctions and administrative supervision and judicial review
5. Special legal regime which should ensure professionalism and accountability	
6. Changing role throughout time (from observance of rules and regulations to increased focus on performance)	

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Today, the changing role of the state and public administration requires a flexible concept of a public service and a public servant. Since it is hard to speak of a single definition of the concept of a public servant, we analysed often-conflicting theoretical understandings that can bring us closer to understanding the true essence of this notion.

The definition of the concept of a public servant has often been associated with defining the role that public administration plays in a society. For this reason, in the early works of administrative science, public servants were usually defined as the 'authoritative holders of state power', who committed themselves to the lawful performance of duties, loyalty, and obedience, and stand in a special relationship to the state. Most contemporary authors, however, underlie professionalism and acting in the public interest

as key features that define the concept of a public service and a public servant.

The terminology on the use of the concept of 'public servant' is also not uniform. The administrative science defines the general term 'public servant' in a way it corresponds to the positive law systems of many countries. More often than not, the theoretical concept relies on that from positive law, which, likewise, is not uniform in legislative practice. A clear indication of terminological discrepancy can be found in different terms used to depict this concept – administrative officials, administrative workers, administrative staff, civil servants, officials, bureaucrats, and alike.

Although the concept of a public servant does change with time, we have tried to identify the key features that persist and are likely to stick with this concept in the future. As each state needs to ensure



public service with adequate standards of professionalism, stability, continuity, and accountability of public service, we hope that the identified features will be able to stand the test of time.

At the same time, however, we should be aware that more detailed analysis of the concept of a public servant needs to take into account the broader and individual context of every country – including social, legal, and political aspects. In this sense, our proposed common definition

can serve only as a basis for further research and analysis. Each country needs to find its own way in defining the concept of its public servant, in a constant strive towards finding the right balance between competing values and principles: flexibility and the need for stability; autonomy and accountability; individualism and collective action; that will undoubtedly shape the concept of a public servant in diverse directions and individual countries' moulds.

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## CONFLICTS AND DEMOCRACY IN ETHNICALLY COMPLEX SOCIETIES AND ROLE OF MEDIA THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA IN 1999

*Intervention, victims and stereotypes*

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**Abstract:** The text herein is inspired by Hans Magnus Enzensberger and his writings about “nucleated” civil wars initiated by interethnic differences. Placing his thoughts in context of media, he sees those wars as a spectacle which makes the audience perceive it as a moral problem. The paradigm for interpreting these conclusions may also be the influence of media on perception of events in Yugoslavia in 1999. The starting questions are, therefore, directed towards analysing the validity of such conclusions, which we try to do by explaining the nature of relationship between wars and media influence, as well as the origin of stereotypes about the Balkans – their multiplication with start of conflict and influence of the media on it. In doing so, we can also notice the misconceptions and the effects they produced; with parallel analysis of the essential principles of journalistic reporting, but also a clear disregard for them, with the aim to show their causes too. This makes it possible to deduce what was the effect of reporting and how much it led to problem-solving and transformation of the Balkan societies, or it caused new stereotyping and problems. In this way, all the pointlessness of the conflict and NATO’s interventions are also demonstrated, and the conclusion of the analysis becomes a confirmation of Enzensberger’s thinking.

**Keywords:** Yugoslavia, NATO bombing, media reporting, journalism ethics, the Balkans, interethnic conflicts.

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## INTRODUCTION

Enzensberger's conclusions on conflicts, such as those that happened in former Yugoslavia at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, point out that ideology is reduced to the most brutal forms of violence, without thinking about the consequences, which leads to self-destruction. Therefore, he suggests that the reality is different, and that such problems should be solved before they become part of the global political agenda (Enzensberger, 1994: 29). The impression is that we have to state its validity, when it is obvious that the majority of international interventions represent a kind of hypocrisy, manifested through violent intervention and accompanied by unjustified preaching of big and powerful, which Enzensberger also notes in this place. He points out that this approach is constant of foreign politics of great powers, while, unfortunately, one of the constants of politics in this area represents a departure from reality, which leads to frequent interpersonal conflicts. The paradox of the politics of the Balkan states, therefore, is also reflected in the insistence on non-interference of the others, while, at the same time, expecting that our problems could only be resolved by intervention from the outside. Enzensberger argues that today the media inform the public in a way that the war can become a moral problem, and that influential nations and

individuals act only when the fight for protection of moral coincide with their own interests. Therefore, such focus is suitable for the study from the perspective of deeply-divided societies in the Balkans (Enzensberger also did), and an adequate paradigm for the analysis is an influence of the media on the perception of events in former Yugoslavia. He also refers to it by saying that the interests of the big for conflicts of the small runs only while it is a good content of a new media spectacle. This text is framed by the events during the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia 1999, but also after that, because it is difficult and scientifically incorrect to analyse this period isolated. Analyses of narrative and discourse within which the content of the media was created show their impact, and also pose the question at the same time – how much they follow the norms of journalistic professionalism and desire to help solving of the problem, or it has led to the new stereotypes and more complex problems, by violating the basic principles of the profession? In that way, we recognize the effects of media messages on the society and the individuals, who often know little about the far distant regions, as well as their causes: but also the consequences of constant stereotyping (stigmatization) of the Balkans.

## VERSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

General guidelines of the European Convention on Human Rights, considering the fact that most of them get ignored in the war, are a good introduction for further consideration of this article thesis. This was also the case in

Yugoslavia in 1999, because it is obvious that they have been violated by all parties, but also by those who, paradoxically, started their activities with referring to them, given the fact that the NATO intervention was contrary to the



second article of the UN Charter, the fifth article of the NATO Agreement, and the constitutions of most countries in the NATO coalition. The wars in the Balkans were also an opportunity for intellectuals to express themselves. The bombing, for example, was supported by Mario Vargas Llosa, Michael Walzer and Bernard-Henri Lévy, while others, such as Régis Debray, Peter Handke and Noam Chomsky were against it, and they experienced the intellectual-media lynching because of it. Debreu tried to point out his position, by explaining: "I am not pro-Serbian, nor anti-Serbian; as it tries to impose, but I am against all types of Empire" (Debreu, quoted according to Kokanus, 1999). Volzer, a supporter of the so-called "Just war theory",<sup>2</sup> at the presentation of his book in Belgrade, however, explained that the war in Bosnia was experienced through images presented by the Western media, and that he "supported the intervention, under the influence of these", and admitted also that "his and many intellectuals' attitudes regarding the NATO bombing in 1999 were inspired by the media coverage of Bosnia", but he also said that he "stressed that such act will not resolve the problems" (Predstavlanje knjiga Majkla Volzera, 2010). The version, supported by most of the Western media and the public, referenced this epilogue: international organizations and most of the Western media reported that the massacre in Račak happened on January 15, 1999, where the Serbian troops, allegedly, killed 45 Albanians. This event, the subject of many controversy, was a turning point because despite all legal and humanitarian arguments, a decision was taken for the NATO to inter-

vene militarily, justified by the desire to prevent further conflict: the NATO had threatened that it would begin its intervention if the Serbian army did not withdraw from Kosovo and let the peacekeepers deploy there, which was not accepted by the Serbian leaders, and it led to the bombing of Yugoslavia, from March 22 till June 11, after which Kosovo came under the UN administration.

To analyse the situation in the Balkans, and not to refer at least briefly to the dimension of the impact of political decisions, would be, at least, incomplete. Anti-Serb hysteria that spread from official sources to the media, who openly put themselves into their service, was created "slowly and imperceptibly, creating the basis for the military involvement of the Western allies, but the leader of the last big country in the Balkans also did not recognize that circumstances have changed", observes Jevtović, and noting that he (Milosević) and his associates "might missed the directive NSDD No.54 (US Policy Towards Easter Europe) of the Council for national security (1982) and Directive No. NSDD. 133 (US Policy towards Yugoslavia), which as early as in 1984 determined the general plan for breaking up of Yugoslavia, and rapid reintegration of the new regime in the global corporate environment" (Jevtović, 2017: 65). Michael "Misha" Glenny, who often criticized Serbs, explored the often bad relationship between the Balkans and the Great Powers, and stated that the Western intervention is one of the main causes of such a problem and that "intervention in Kosovo is the same", with accentuating the wrong efforts to solve the problem by making a new bloodshed (Glenny, 2012: 635). Ac-

2 This theory is based on the view that military interventions, which are of a so-called humanitarian nature, are justified, because they aim to defend those who are subjected to tyranny, and thus such wars are similar to those that are waged for self-defence.



cording to the Serbian sources, since the NATO attacks started “114 policemen and 462 soldiers died, and the death of civilians is still questionable, but estimates range from 1,200 to 5,700”, while the NATO announced that it could cause a murder of 1,500 civilians, with no casualties outside Kosovo: with that number (at least 1,200 civilians) it goes to a number of around 15,300 dead (Human Rights Watch, 2009). However we try to aggregate such data, the result is tragic, and the question of a true cause inevitably pop-ups; hence the justification of the NATO intervention, but also the role of the media. That is why Jevtović and Bajić are taking the perspective of “media centrism” in their analysis as “important doctrine hybrid war, based on a combination of ideological, propaganda, intelligence and psychological operation in which the imposition of symbolic concepts and targeting sense to focus public opinion” (Jevtović & Bajić 2019: 111). Even a brief

analysis of media coverage proves such a choice as a correct one, indicating the consequences at the same time. NATO began to influence the media from the start of its intervention, but journalists also voluntarily published the news that contributed to that side. Therefore, it is clear that the war propaganda nowadays “is not old-fashioned censorship, but knowledge to capture images that cannot be resisted”, writes Klun, also noting that “the lack of discussion about the issue is a result of image uniformity, and that is how it became easier to assure the public, while the simulated polls assured politicians” (Klun, 2000: 78). The media as a “means of pressure are nothing new, because, by manipulating people with their fears, they are acting on their homogenization”, correctly observes Jevtović, who concludes that in the complex circumstances in Yugoslavia, the story of “Yugoslavia was too complicated”, while “anti-Serb narratives were simple and clear” (Jevtović, 2017: 66).

### CONFLICT AND MEDIA, JOURNALISM ETHICS AND VICTIMS

War conflict is one of the constants of humanity and it is impossible to express all its horrors by the numbers. According to some data, only in the last decade the result shows that more than two million children have died and more than one million were orphaned. In the important documents of the US military, RAND: Project–AIR FORCE, it is stated that the West has a mission to prevent the killing of civilians in the war, but also that the

media and the public believe that civilian casualties are used as a justification for their participation, and hence the concern for public support (Larson & Savych, 2006). Numerous explanations, such as those of “ancient hatreds”<sup>3</sup> or “security dilemma”<sup>4</sup> still do not give a complete picture of the situation and the causes of such conflicts. The problem is also the lack of knowledge of media impact on the conflict. Jusić, therefore,

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3 The theory-explanation rooted in ethnological, even anthropological assumptions, from which, allegedly, originates the predisposition of certain peoples-nations-communities to start a conflict when circumstances prompt it.

4 The term-explanation-theory in international relations, which is applied when a country, when seeking to increase its security (e.g. by strengthening military strength or forming alliances), also influences others in the environment to respond with similar measures, which inevitably leads to tension, and often causes a conflict.



concludes that “the media influence the conflict, while conflict and its context have an impact on the media at the same time, because of which media involvement in monitoring conflicts is shaping public reaction” (Jusić, 2008: 40-63). It is obvious that the political influence of the actors of the conflict affects the attitudes of the public, and therefore the image that the media present, which, in turn, focus on the topics which are primarily interesting to the domestic public. Barović recalls that war stories are always the first news; and a good example of that happened during the bombing of Yugoslavia: “CNN daily budget was \$ 150,000 and it had losses of over 1.5 million dollars”. That is why he also notes that “the media did not invent war, but that we must admit as justified that they figuratively introduced it to the homes of consumers of information” (Barović, 2008: 143-152). At the same time, he also says that the largest number of reporters followed the events in Kosovo without preparation and knowledge, and, therefore, stressed that “for the cause of the quality of reporting and personal safety, a journalist has an obligation to become familiar with a number of elements” (Barović, 2008: 143-152). Branko Klun notes that the situation intensified after a report on Račak, because such images “contribute to shaping public opinion which allows politicians to justify their strategies” (Klun, 2000: 78). The case, which is often taken as an example of bad reporting is the CNN report in April 1999, and the image of Albanian refugees and the girl crying, while snowing outside, when winter is long gone, a temperature is at around 18 degrees (Salmon, 2010: 98). Jevtović, therefore, justifiably refers to the so-called doctrine of *low intensity conflict*, which is being analysed in this example of Račak, which means a

model of the intervention in three phases: 1) *media preparation of the public*; 2) *causing the intervention*, and 3) *a media offensive* (Jevtović, 2017: 72). In an article which is also signed by Bajić, Jevtović refers to two other techniques applied in Yugoslavia 1999, at the centre of which is also the media: *doctrine of low intensity conflict* and *the technique of provoking informative silence*. According to the former, “media in crisis situations have the task of inflaming emotions, so that facts are marginalized”. The latter was first applied in this case: “The number of transmitters and their audibility in neighbouring countries has tripled, muffling the signals from the Serbia and in the airspace the electronic communication made the hoop to prevent penetration of unwanted opinions” (Jevtović & Bajić 2019: 120). The power of the media is what makes journalists responsible for the veracity of their contents. Problems arise when you need to determine what and, especially, how to report. Freedom of the media is, however, the assumption of a free society, and vice versa, and journalistic ethics “must refer to the public, to whom it is intended in the first place” (Žaket, 2007: 12). Žaket also writes that, if we ask ourselves about the cause of the existence of journalists, the answer is to provide essential services: “to collect data and report on the news, so that we can use them, however, as in the case of every valuable and potentially hazardous substance, its purity is of the utmost importance” (Žaket, 2007: 17). Media theorists, thus, believe that the media have a special status in society only thanks to the objectivity of the journalists, which is, according to Allan: “journalistic standards and a resource for protection of pressure” (Allan, 1997: 297). Analysis of the norms of journalistic ethics may be hardly achievable, but which we must





strive for, therefore, provides us with an answer to a following question – what kind of help it is for the journalists and the public which they should serve? It is clear that the media in the case of Yugoslavia in 1999 solidly betrayed its ideals, failing to answer the questions that are now imperative of good reporting: causes (*Why?*), which requires that the media should place an event into a broader context; and consequences (*What next?*), which suggests that we need to point out its further development. Peter A. Brock analysed why the journalists agreed to trample the principles of their profession. He uses the term “media cleaning”, tailored to the source of news stories about “ethnic cleansing”, that have “led to a decade of war and persistent problems in the Balkans for all”, where journalists “deliberately put themselves as the service of propaganda of war and contributed to the Balkans perception as a region of evil, that will deeply destabilize Europe” (Brock, 2006: 8). He reminded about the example of David Binder, the *The New York Times* journalist, with rich experience of reporting from the Balkans. When he tried to point out to the deeper causes of problems in this region, which also depicted Albanians as negative, the editors did not accept the texts, and they were not published, so he had to write about it in other newspapers. Through the phrases that journalists use, we can also identify the attitudes of politicians on developments in this region, and Mirjana Vasović estimated that the euphemisms (such as, *collateral damage, ethnic cleansing...*) were sought to prevent the setting up of ethical issues (Vasović, 2004). Critics often estimate that the media lack integrity and professionalism, because they accept censorship and repackaging of the facts in order to support the government and offi-

cial sources. That is how the once-called “watchdog of democracy” has become a means of propaganda, promoter of dubious interests and an “obedient poodle” (Reljić, 2011: 56).

It is clear that ethics was not the most important in reporting from the Balkans. The reasons are also in working conditions for journalists, but we can notice a large number of those who have deliberately misled the public for the sake of a support for a particular politics and interests. Todorova points out that “foreign news are always easier to distort” (NIN (2006, 7th of January)), while Stojanović says that, unlike domestic news story, in international ability to control rapidly decreases, primarily due to the physical distance (Stojanović, 2000). Therefore, after all, how Papagiannis concludes: “All stories should be explored in a broader context” (Šajkaš, 2007). Otherwise, the results are inaccurate generalizations and conclusions. That is why Diana Johnstone concludes “that the analogies must be drawn cautiously, as they should not cloud the fact” (Johnstone, 2002: 25). In the way of reporting from the Balkans, Vesna Goldsworthy also sees “an opportunity to achieve imperialism of the Westerners, about drawing borders and step towards organizing the rebellious natives” (Goldsvorti, 2000: 3). In trying to explain the war in the Balkans as predestined by the Balkan people to kill each other diminished the ability to prevent it. This mechanism can still be seen in the perception of these people, so the stereotypes about Serbs are also based on it. In practice, they are described as “filters”. Herman and Chomsky created a model of their analysis, that examines the impact of economic and political elites on the media, but they also note that major US dailies, during the 1990s did not





publish any articles written by the people of Serbian origin, so it is logical that the Serbs, on the basis of general prejudice of the Balkans, became synonymous of evil (Brock, 2006). Modern trends that are transforming the world into a global

village, with the dictation of the global economy trends, dominant ideologies and political power influenced from the few centres, put before the media the task to explain the local events in a way that is understandable globally.

## INTERVENTION, PROPAGANDA AND STEREOTYPES

When you look at the titles of some media, it is appropriate to question the consequences. Many of them justifiably criticized certain features of political leaders and their loyal media, but the approach of most of them encouraged even greater chaos. A few days before the bombing, Jason Fields from Associated Press wrote that: "The Balkans is destroyed by the hatred among its ethnic groups, all of which have something in common – Balkan Peninsula, and to find something else would be a real challenge" (NIN (2006, 7th of January)). This statement sufficiently indicates the attitude of most of the Western media and the public.

David Model believes that it is easy to notice that the Western media had not a critical approach to NATO, and presents an article written by *Chris Hedges* on June 2, 1998, for *The New York Times*, where he wrote that "Milosević, despite the efforts of American diplomacy to come to negotiations, is determined to destroy the resistance of Kosovo Albanians", but he forgot to say (Model noticed) that the KLA had attacked Serbs, and that the Serbian police arrived in Kosovo to prevent it (Model, 2005: 5). Model also alleges that CNN quoted Madeleine Albright, then the U. S. Secretary of State, on March 24, 1999, who said that the goal of NATO is not to harm innocent people, whose "truth" revealed later. Thus he concludes that "the writing of

some American media is a real example of official control of state administration, because the stories are drawn from administrative sources, without checking the information from the field" (Model, 2005: 5). Kačanik case is particularly interesting, because it became a place of an international circus in just one day, where all media people raced trying to be the first to discover, allegedly, mass graves of innocent civilians. The newspaper *Independent* reported on June 15, 1999, that the bodies were buried under several inches of the ground, because the Serbs ran out of time. The text is, however, in contradiction with that headline, because in that case they would not have time to bury the bodies and dig graves for new victims, as also described within the article.

Overview of several earlier articles in this newspaper points to a different focus of content in the previous period, which supports the thesis that the media skilfully steered around official politics. For example, David Binder on January 1, 1987, wrote that "ethnic differences and tensions clearly point to the possibility of civil war, and that the paramilitary forces of Albanians, who are well-armed and have separatist ambitions, are increasingly attacking Serbs, wishing to provoke their reaction". He was later withdrawn from the Balkans, and that is why many experts, like Phil Hammond,



stand out that even when the journalists tried to reported correctly, the editors hesitated to published it, if it was different from the official policy (Hammond, 2000). That is why analyses should not lead to the generalization, which would disqualify the entire media, because we can also notice some cases of professional reporting. Some of them wrote about the errors of NATO, as well as about the crimes committed by Albanians. Paul Watson from The Los Angeles Times is one of them, who had been in Kosovo during the conflict, and his articles consistently represented the complexity of the situation. A well-known case, which Hammond describes, is the text about an Albanian Saipu Reci, the pro-Yugoslav soldier of the Yugoslav Army, which the editorial board did not want to publish, because it did not fit into the image that officials insisted on (Hammond, 2000). Such examples are also the texts written by Jeffrey Smith from *The Washington Post*, who wrote in July 1999 about the bombing that killed two Kosovo Serbs, and about the fact that more than 330 Serbian civilians were killed since the NATO forces entered in Kosovo. He also noted that *violence against Serbs is surprisingly brutal*, and revealed how it happened that the KLA remained under arms, because Albright convinced Gerhard Schröder to agree on the conversion of the KLA into a civilian national guard, which was also opposed by Britain. *The New York Times* also published an article on the KLA, stated that in the absence of a stronger international presence, it established wide control. The Western media mostly described Milosević as the organizer of the war, in order to build a “Greater Serbia”, through “ethnic cleansing”. The called him “a butcher of Belgrade” and a “criminal leader”, and compared him to Hitler, while Serbian

soldiers were portrayed by the model of film villains. Michael Parenti, however, noted that they did not immediately adopt such a view of Milosević – it happened later, when he was seen as a goal, not as an instrument (Parenti, 2003). Michael Mandel, therefore, analyses Balkan wars through its participants, their motivation and strategy, and most importantly – through the role of external actors (PR company, Western European powers, UN ...) – his focus is on the role of the media, which, according to him, share responsibility in encouraging conflict, and the role of the journalist-government agitators for the politics of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Media initiatives for more concrete military action “under the excuse of prevention of ethnic cleansing, was used to justify the war propaganda; and magnified problems and prejudices about the Balkan peoples”, he concludes (Mandell, 2004: 98). Diana Johnstone points out that “the focus on the concept of ‘justice’ and attempts to present that the Serbs are the only ones responsible for crimes, was actually the backbone of the Bosnian Muslims and then Kosovar Albanians” (Johnstone, 2000: 5). Mandel and Johnstone, therefore, equally recognized that journalists were easily convinced that the fight against evil, which was represented by the Serbs, meant liabilities and less risk; and began to simplify the situation and sympathize with administrative sources, eventually becoming addicted to them (mainly the UN and NATO). In the analysis of *The New York Times* reporting by Edward Herman, he uses a sample of 120 articles written by Marlies Simons, and concludes that she even established “a clear pattern of writing in order to favorize NATO interpretation”, which also supports the arguments of those who criticize the lack of interest of



journalist for the history of the Balkans (Herman, 2005: 6).

Stella Jatras estimates that one of the major examples of bias is *The Washington Times*, who has become “a part of the liberal propaganda machine, which has led to numerous victims”, and she recalls that Philip Smucker wrote about the mass grave in Orahovac at its front page on August 6, 1998, with a picture of a bulldozer on a garbage dump, describing that the bodies of more than 500 Albanians were left there, half of them women and children, and that the Serbs denied the massacre, although the digging did not even start. The very next day, in the same newspaper, but in the corner of the page 15, there was the news in just two sentences, with no picture, but with the official statement from the NATO that no bodies were found; but with no denial of a previous one – therefore, she concludes that “the borders in the formulation of the story has nothing to do with accuracy, but with what brings rewards” (Jatras, 2001). Edward Herman recalls the statement by General Lewis Mackenzie, former commander of UNPROFOR, in the newspaper *The Globe & Mail*, on June 15, 2005, where he said that “the picture is much more complex than black and white in Western media”, and he also notes that the US Department of State said that about 500,000 Albanians were killed, but later it was confirmed that there were up to 7,000 on all sides, but nobody answered or at least acknowledged the mistake. Ted Grant and Alan Woods wrote that the bombing was intended to help the Albanians, but that it made the situation worse for everyone, as also acknowledged by some representatives of NATO, and that is why “NATO raised the propaganda war to a new level”, which made it clear that “the first casualty of war is usually the

truth” (Grant & Woods, 2006). NATO propaganda was based on exaggeration and it served as a cover for its intervention. A large media space was also given to the politicians, and it also served for their internal wars, but it affected the public image of the region, too. Thus, the media also, indirectly suggested moves opposite to the principles of law and democracy, which, according to them, was threatened in this region.

From today’s perspective, it can be noted that the interest of the Western, and especially American media for the Balkans, was limited to the periods when the domestic public and political structures were, as some authors estimate, hungry for “images of destruction and killing”. This is confirmed by the fact that the web-site of, at that time, in Serbia prohibited Radio B92, had as many as 15 million visitors outside the borders of Serbia, in the period of only 10 days. After the culmination of the conflict, when they should specifically indicate the errors and potential responses, the Balkan issues are pushed to the margins of those media. When it comes to the US media, the largest ones, such as *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, are the only ones who continuously covered events here. Goldsworthy writes that the interest in the West Balkans lasts as long as the wars (Goldsworthy, According to Vesković, 2008), while Aleksa Djilas explains that the American public interest dictates the influence of the media; stating that there is no rooted hatred of the Serbs there, but also that the negative image still exists today, so even when the Serbs are the victims, they try to justify it by blaming it on the bad policy of Milošević and its regime – he also notes one paradox, by saying that it was difficult “to find military officers who openly supported aggressive policy towards



Serbia, but not journalists”, although this is, how he explains, not a surprise “if we have in mind the desire of the media for sensationalism and their irresponsible, because unlike the officers, journalists are unaccountable in that way” (Politika (2003, 23th of June)).

On the other hand, the challenges of globalization, technological revolution and the global economic crisis – the impact of all this on the media, influenced

the reduction of media capacities and changes to the way of their functioning. The media management explain such reduction with lower domestic interest for the news from abroad. This is, however, the reason for criticism of the media, which rightly warn that they rely heavily on agency reports and begin to be interested for news abroad only when problems reach a climax, which is resulting in chaotic reporting.

### MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

The importance of the media propaganda, as a component of the war, was familiar to all parties – NATO, but also the regime in Serbia. Most of the media in Serbia followed the myth that the regime created – that Serbia is the winner of “unprovoked aggression”, while, for example, *The New York Times* claimed that NATO bombs caused less damage than it was the case.

Klun illustrates the role of propaganda in the war, by providing an example of the confidential report of Media operations centre, which was conveyed by *Der Spiegel*, where a spokeswoman for the French Government reported on the growing dilemma in the French public about the attack, and asked to “help with media content, with instructions that the nature should be focused on stories about refugees and Serbian crimes” (Klun, 2000: 78). New technologies have certainly affected the media, and the media construction of reality (wars too), and media technology fundamentally transformed warfare on the other side. Long ago, has noted inconsistency of strategy and rationality of communication (Habermas, 1991), and the criticism of the reporting on Kosovo is related to

the strategic influence of official administration in many media. Namely, once dominated the time between the event and its reporting, enabling the creation of news, now does not exist, because strategic rationality dominates and it does not allow a critical deflection and understanding of information, how Paul Virilio states correctly, and warning that “we cannot believe our eyes anymore, because events are manipulated by various directors” (Virilio, 2003). A part of the problem is also that the media “as the fourth pillar of democracy yield in the immediate notification”, as noted by the Klun, warning that it is “a threat to an intellect, but also for a man in his being” (Klun, 2000). That is the reason why many intellectuals say that the media today are a threat to rational thinking and democracy.

In addition to these components, in the course of it and after the Yugoslav wars at the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, a plenty of literature on the subject of identity and mentality of the people in the Balkans also appeared. The book that has had a major impact was *Balkan Ghosts* by Robert D. Kaplan, best-selling about the Balkans in the United States for a long time,





and the first about this region which, by its own admission, Bill Clinton has read. Kaplan, in turn, wrote about the Balkans as a haunted place and demanded a strong military intervention against the Bosnian Serbs (Kaplan, 1993: 47). That is why Timothy Garton Ash accused him that he gave credibility to allegations that the bloody ethnic conflicts are endemic in the Balkans and that a new war is inevitable. Partial change was made in the book *Bosnia: A Short History* by Noel Malcolm in 1994, and Richard Holbrooke later emphasized that the Bosnian war would have lasted shorter, if it had been released earlier. He, however, understood it in a way that he concluded from it that the “Balkan history is a mix of complicated and trivial things, which is the best to be ignored” (NIN (2006, January). Milica Bakić-Hayden reasonably concludes that the terms “Balkans” and “balkanization” become suitable for the construction of the symbolic form of the distinction from the “second” and “less civilized” rest of the world, which is also easy to notice in certain media, and that was also the position of the West in relation to Yugoslavia (Bakić-Hayden 2006: 34). Ksenija Šabec notes that expression “balkanization” mainly appears “to describe fragmentation and conflict” (Šabec, 2004), and increased the prejudices about Balkan, as a place where less civilized people live, and the use of “balkanization” as a process that leads to the primitive behaviour. Tim Judah, therefore, emphasizes “the importance of understanding of historical dimension of the events in the Balkans at the late 20<sup>th</sup> century” (Judah, 2009: 22).

A variety of literature, however, did not result in clear conclusions, mostly because they are directed towards unilateral conclusions and insufficiently reliable sources. It is, therefore, not surprising

that most people outside the Balkans, after the breakup of Yugoslavia, place the Balkan from Siberia to Syria and compare it with a lower category of civilization. The complexity of the causes and circumstances of the modern Balkan conflicts have not helped the researcher’s work. Hence, perhaps, the attempt of the media for the reactivation and upgrading of old stereotypes was easier for them in order to present the Balkan complexity. Predrag J. Marković writes that “stereotypes are defined as simplified, often prejudiced conception of reality, resistant to change” (Marković, 2001: 205). Stereotypes, as a mixture of fantasy and reality, do not have to be one-dimensional and unchangeable phenomena, because they can be modified; and be negative, neutral or positive. During the crisis, negative ones are multiplying. They often serve a purpose of the projection of personal characteristics on another. As a logical one, there is therefore the question of the source of stereotypes. Simple examination can determine that long before the breakup of Yugoslavia the Balkan peoples were described as primitive. The term “Balkan” quickly became infamous, as soon as it was accepted as the name of this peninsula in mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, and also its “presentation in a negative light and attempt to make a distance from the negative otherness, which led to new problems and to the impossibility of discovering their causes” (Norris, 2002: 56). That is why it also started “increasingly to imitate that negative image in reality too” (NIN (2006, 16<sup>th</sup> of January)). Todorova, therefore, concludes that *one thing is haunting the culture of the West – bogey of Balkan* (Todorova, 2006: 25). Stereotypes of the Balkans, therefore, can be seen through the relationship between media initiatives and policy decisions, and vice ver-





sa, and it is one of the important topics in the analysis of the events of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. Foreign media have had a positive role, alarming about certain things, but a good part of the public and experts consider that they often lack the balance of the information. One of the issues, therefore, is the role of journalists in the

war propaganda and their influence in a specific cultural and political context. It is certain that they can contribute to the search for truth, but that they also could be one of the obstacles along the way, as it mostly was in Yugoslavia case, which certainly needs to be deeply investigated.

## CONCLUSIONS

Establishing an adequate conclusion about the impact of media on the events in Yugoslavia in 1999 is still not easy. Perhaps it is not quite possible, because too much was, and still is, in the game – from the obvious economic interest to deep-rooted national sentiment. Therefore, as we see, we can only talk about individual examples and the global position of media in the context of various external influences and their effects on the public, with caution to avoid the pitfalls of constructing conspiracy theories. Discussions about the victims and pictures in the Western media are now reviving occasionally, but they are still clearly biased, and the focus is on the future of the so-called independent Kosovo. On the other side, much louder are the conclusions that NATO intervention did not bring anything good, and, as Jevtović and Bajić also concluded, that “the illusion of NATO effectiveness in resolving the crisis is crushed, despite the power and the media demonization of one side” (Jevtović & Bajić 2019: 124). Serbian propaganda has also had a share in creating chaos and this is a topic that requires a separate analysis. One of the aspects that should therefore be analysed is that the stereotypes about the Balkans are also encouraged from the inside. Richard Rorty points out that the national pride of the condition of

self-improvement of the state does not mean that we should ignore errors that the state is making, and he criticizes politicians who build distance from their people, thinking that they will keep the power in that way, when, in fact, they are doing the opposite (Rorty, 1999: 16), and Jusić correctly assessed that the crucial variable that affects the media during the crisis is the political control (Jusić, 2008).

The paradigm of media impact in this case, therefore, clearly coincides with the estimates of Enzensberger, who also indicates errors of a less powerful nation, while explaining the involvement and impact of the great powers and their media on their future. Yet, another aspect of these conflicts also should be one of the angles of reflection of the context considered here, as an example of a similar manufacture and a discourse which Enzensberger interprets. Maria Todorova writes that since the breakup of Yugoslavia more students around the world are writing the papers about it; that courses on the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans are always full, and numerous publications have appeared, some of which is good, although most of them have sensational character. Thus, paradoxically, this tragedy helped the growing interest in this region. The only question is



whether this trend is good and whether it leads to introducing region and creating a new discourse, because it is often structured by the same language stereotypes. The Balkans is, in fact, still a metaphor for many negatives. This does not mean that it cannot be changed, and that this term, which exceeds its primary geographical feature, is always used in such a manner. It is good that the experts from

this region are engaged, but we should be careful that this story is not discursive hermetically, following the patterns by which some of the media reported from here; and thus remain the subject of a university course, because the reality says that, unfortunately, the media have a greater impact on a global picture than the relevant academic circles.

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## CHALLENGES, RISKS AND THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE 4<sup>TH</sup> INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

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**Abstract:** The world has been gradually entering the fourth industrial revolution, where a new wave of technological advancement will bring humanity into a new era of globalization. Global supply chains will become more efficient while reducing transport costs, which will contribute to opening new markets and drive economic growth. According to an analysis by the World Economic Forum, the fourth industrial revolution will increase the level of global income and quality of life for people around the world. However, increasing intersectionality and emerging technological trends will expose humanity to new forms of security challenges, risks and threats such as Internet fraud and data theft, cyberattacks, large-scale spontaneous migration, climate change, etc., as stated in the 2020 Global Economic Forum's Global Risk Report.

**Keywords:** human security, fourth industrial revolution, globalization, challenges, risks and threats.

### INTRODUCTION

“What are the challenges, risks and threats to human security brought by the fourth industrial revolution?” represents the key research question of this paper. In addition to trying to discover the link between the fourth industrial revolution and the new era of globalization, the paper focuses on analysing the possible negative implications that a new era of

interconnectedness and technological advancement for the security of the individual and society. The example of the position of the Republic of Serbia within the Belt and Road Initiative will be used to present possible security challenges, risks and threats to which a society and individuals may be exposed in the new era of the industrial revolution.

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## THE 4<sup>th</sup> INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND GLOBALIZATION

The fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0 or 4IR) is characterized by a fusion of technology that is blurring the lines between the physical, biological, and digital worlds. In fact, it is the development and combination of new and emerging technologies in the field of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information and communication technologies, cognitive sciences, and their convergence in the form of artificial intelligence that will facilitate the building of wholly automated “factories of the future” (Gillieron, 2019). In this way, technological development shifts the world of labour in the fourth industrial revolution that will radically change the way we live, work and communicate (WEF, 2016; Davis & O’Halloran, 2018). In terms of scale and complexity, the 4IR will be completely different from anything that the humanity has experienced before. A new wave of technological advancement encouraged by Industry 4.0 will bring humankind to a new era of globalization, the so-called “Globalization 4.0” (Gillieron, 2019).

In the process of globalization, technology plays a key role in shaping opportunities and risks, so it can be concluded that globalization and technology are closely linked. Namely, one of the key scientific and technological breakthroughs that are important prerequisites for globalization are the global availability and exchange of information through new information and communication technologies that allow jobs the relocation of job opportunities across globe to the countries where workers have necessary qualifications, because we live in a time when it becomes clear that the business

needs not be tied to a fixed location (Ljajić et al., 2016). However, unlike the previous eras of globalization that were driven by economic-political liberalization and information and communication technology, the only driving force behind the new era of globalization will be technology (Williamson, 1998; Fukuda-Parr, 2003). Today, it can truly be confirmed that Globalization 4.0 is shaped solely by the development of new technologies brought to us by Industry 4.0 (WEF, 2019).

Globalization is a phenomenon driven by technology and the movement of ideas, people, and goods. Essentially, with the emergence of new technologies, the flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas has been accelerated, enabling each of us, no matter where we live, to reach around the world further, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before, and enabling the world to reach into each of us further, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before (Friedman, 1999). On the other hand, each new era of globalization has a different and stronger impact on employment, income and human health, creating new security risks and threats primarily in the economic and social spheres (Robertson & Khondker, 1998; Fukuda-Parr, 2003; Kamei, 2012). Given the assumption that a new era of globalization will have the strongest impact on society so far, it can be concluded that Globalization 4.0 will produce the most serious challenges, risks and threats to the security of people and communities by reaching further, faster, deeper, and cheaper.



## **IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION 4.0 AND INDUSTRY 4.0 ON THE SECURITY OF THE INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY**

Globalisation is a wild process involving interconnectedness and exclusion, integration and fragmentation, homogenisation and diversity (Kaldor, 2000: 4). Nevertheless, unlike the previous stages of globalization, Globalization 4.0 is the latest stage of globalization which involves cutting-edge new technologies like artificial intelligence that powers forward with the explosion of information technology. These technologies shrink distances, open up borders and minds, and bring people all across the globe closer together. However, introducing the world into the global age, disruptive technologies foster more intense interconnectedness, creating the so-called “network society” (Castells, 1996). Considering that, the

most basic human needs, such as water and energy supply, or service sectors such as health, economy and education, are becoming more and more digitized and dependent on 4.0 technologies. Due to a high degree of technological interconnectedness in the era of Globalization 4.0, network society is multiplying increasing the vulnerability of every human being, as well as the importance of human security. In fact, Globalization 4.0 encouraged by Industry 4.0 has an impact on transforming the systems of communications, transportation, production, energy and distribution, health, producing new threats to human security or enhancing the intensity of traditional threats to human security.

### *Human security and Globalization 4.0*

The concept of human security was first defined in the UNDP Human Development Report (1994) as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. In the light of such comprehension, human security concept envisions protecting human beings from various threats through an independent and subjective lens. The basic human needs of food security, healthcare, education and a safe habitat, are enshrined in the notion of human security along with socio-economic notions such as providing for one’s family, the stability of livelihood, trust in surrounding community and associated social relationships (Chugh, 2018). Essentially, the concept of human security involves protection against chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, i.e. protection against sudden and harmful disorders in patterns of

daily life (UNDP, 1994). These threats to the security of an individual come from seven different dimensions of human security, i.e. economic security (e.g. unemployment, inflation, homelessness), food security (e.g. problems related to the physical and economic access to healthy food), health security (e.g. infectious and parasitic diseases, HIV and other viruses), environmental security (e.g. degradation of ecosystems, natural disasters), personal security (e.g. physical, domestic and workplace violence), community security (e.g. ethnic tensions and violent conflicts) and political security (e.g. state repression and human rights violations). Since there are four basic dimensions of the globalization process (economic, political, socio-cultural, and environmental) and given that the security of human collectivises, according to



Buzan (2007), is influenced by factors from five sectors (economic, political, social, military, and environment), we can conclude that globalization affects all of these dimensions of human security. In summary, the threats to human security caused by globalization in the economic sphere are: social inequality, the dominance of economically powerful states, the generation of a global economic crisis, etc.; in the socio-political: illegal migration to developed countries, domination of certain languages and cultural patterns, interventionism on behalf of certain ideas or ideals, etc.; in the environmental sphere: global warming, the spread of viruses and diseases, the depletion of non-renewable natural

resources, etc.; in the military sphere: the spread of knowledge and technology for the production of weapons of mass destruction, more intensive proliferation of weapons, new forms and greater destructiveness of wars, terrorism, etc. (WEF, 2017; WEF, 2018; WEF, 2019).

Therefore, globalization is a complex multidimensional phenomenon that connects all aspects of society, and as such is a total threat to security of the individual and society. However, to what extent it will be > total < for a society directly depends on the degree of globalization, but also on other factors such as the degree of economic and technological development, openness of society, etc.

#### *Economic dimension of human security in Globalization 4.0*

Consideration of the impact of globalization on society and individuals is most commonly approached from an economic point of view, since other dimensions of globalization are a side effect of economic globalization, or in its service (Ljajić et al, 2016).

If we observe economic security in the narrowest sense, according to Bjelajac (2016), we can differentiate five distinct meanings of economic security: the first meaning refers to production and trade, which directly affect a country's defence capability (e.g. production and trade in military technology, weapons, and key supplies important for the defence system); the second meaning refers to economic policy instruments used as an offensive or defensive tool of security policy, such as boycotts, restrictions on energy supplies, sanctions and various forms of economic assistance; the third meaning refers to the ability to achieve

and/or maintain a certain level of economic development in order to ensure internal security stability, that is, to improve a country's international military political position; the fourth meaning refers to the economic security of the individual, which in the narrow sense means access to food, drinking water and other foodstuffs, or conditions necessary for his physical survival, and more broadly includes issues of employment, poverty, education, etc.; the fifth meaning refers to global economic, social and environmental stability (e.g. stability of the global financial and economic system, depletion of non-renewable resources, environmental pollution, and climate change).

Considering that, since economic globalization directly affects economic security, in case it is at risk, all other aspects of human security are at risk.



The impact of globalization on the economy is closely linked to advances in information technology that facilitate the operations of multinational corporation (Mehdi, 2013). In that way, globalization is connecting and transforming world into a single market, while national industries lose the race with multinationals, leading to fall in employment and rising in inequality. The combination of globalisation and privatisation of economy can give rise to a process, which is almost the reverse of the process through which modern states were constructed resulting in the loss of authority and legitimacy of the state (Kaldor, 2000).

In the era of Globalization 4.0, humanity will face the most serious challenge so far due to the tendency to replace humans with (semi-)automated systems. In these circumstances, low-skilled jobs are exposed to the greatest danger since the percentage of their automation will be significantly higher than high-skilled jobs of automated high-skilled jobs (Bonekamp & Sure, 2015; Heinrich, 2018). As automation replaces low-skilled workforce, society faces new challenges in the form of job losses, higher unemployment rates, and a greater gap between rich and poor, resulting in social change often accompanied by social tensions (Kamei, 2013; Wolf, 2015). A growing economy associated with increased inequalities, unemployment, and rural-urban migration in search of better employment opportunities, combined with the loss of state authority and legitimacy, weakens the rule of law and may lead to the re-emergence of privatised forms of violence such as organised crime and the substitution of “protection” for taxation, vigilantes, private security guards protecting economic facilities, especially international companies, para-military groups associated

with particular political factions, etc. (Kaldor, 2000). As unemployment has the negative impact on the fundamental psychic functioning of people, and above all the transformation of identity (Arnett, 2002; Ljajić et al, 2016), under the influence of globalization, a global culture emerges cancelling the boundaries between national and international, and identifies itself as a threat to national identity and values. This creates “cultural nationalism”, that is, a relationship in which national culture struggles to preserve its cultural authenticity, protecting itself from foreign influences (Mehdi, 2013). Considering that, the economic deprivation and frustration of domicile population, while creating a sense of victimization in certain groups due to foreign influences, can become the basis for the emergence of organised violence and terrorism. Essentially, globalization is a conducive environment for extremists to promote their ideas, win new sympathizers and expand the space of conflict (Nacionalna strategija za sprečavanje i borbu protiv terorizma, 2017). Because of the lack of authority of the state, the loss of confidence of the society that the state is able/willing to respond to public concerns, or the inability and/or unwillingness to regulates the privatisation and informalisation of violence, may result in violent conflicts. Conflicts raised in circumstances like this are called “new wars” by Mary Kaldor (2000).

However, the consequences of 4IR in the form of job losses, migration, or terrorism, do not pose the only threats to society. According to Kamei (2013), much more serious security threats for most people come from disease, hunger, environmental pollution, street crime, or domestic violence whose intensity will also be multiplied in the era of Globalization 4.0.





### *Traditional threats to individual security in Globalization 4.0*

The range of traditional human security threats that accompany every era of globalization is rather wide. Namely, globalization, *per se*, increases the level of prosperity and poverty, while the gap between rich and poor grows and, as such, is one of the main catalysts for criminal behaviour (Morgan, 2002; Nye, 2003). In fact, economic depression and rising unemployment constitute an important factor conducive to the development of organized crime in sense of a conducive ground to destructive and illegal activities, and in particular to the creation of criminal organizations. Specifically, criminological research has found a causal link between economic crises and organized crime, proving that in times of economic crises the number of certain forms of organized crime can almost double (Veljović & Rakočević, 2018).

Therefore, the globalization of the world economy opens the possibility for an increase in the number of crimes committed in the global economy directly threatening human security, such as frauds in the world market, export of unsafe products, offering prohibited products and Internet services, money laundering, trafficking in human beings and white slaves, prostitution, industrial espionage, arms trafficking, weapons proliferation, environmental pollution and degradation, disease spreading, etc. (Williamson, 1998; Fukuda-Parr, 2003; Mehdi, 2013; Eldridge, Koser, Levin, & Rai, 2017; Ignjatović, 2018; Elamiryan, 2019). In this way, the increase in the scope and diversity of organized crime threatens national, but above all, human security.

However, besides the increase in the scope and diversity of crime, the con-

trol and oversight of committed crimes such as trafficking in human beings and white slaves, drugs and/or weapons, smuggling, white collar crime, etc., are much more difficult in Globalization 4.0 because of the new methods and techniques for committing these offences that are made possible by 4IR. In fact, there has been a change in the nature of crime, which has become digital, organized and globally connected thanks to the influence of 4.0 technologies (Tomašević et al., 2020). For example, information technologies have strengthened the black economy and eased the flow of a huge amount of money encouraging transnational organized crime and the relocation of one part of controls over security from state to non-state actors, such as drug cartels, terrorist groups, private security services, paramilitary units, military companies, etc. (Defort, 2015). Moreover, high-tech crime is on the highest increase and millions of people, including children, become victims of attacks every day (Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, 2013). Like criminality, disease has become global, since the cancelation of borders (e.g. within the EU) makes it difficult to monitor and control infectious diseases (e.g. COVID-19 pandemic). The intensity of all these threats is compounded by uncontrolled migration flows triggered by Industry 4.0 which directly affect the increase in crime rates and other crime offences related to migration, such as forgery of documents, illegal crossing and mediation in illegal crossing of the state border, prostitution, kidnapping, coercion, terrorism, etc., while increasing the risk of internal and interstate conflicts (Vulević, 2018). With the increased intensity of traditional threats



and the fact that globalization as a process, in a certain sense, internationalises criminal offences, the fear of traditional

threats to human security in Globalization 4.0 is more than justified.

### *New threats to individual security in Globalization 4.0*

The security implications of 4IR are too complex to fully grasp. However, it should be noted that the most dangerous threats to security of the individuals and society come from the fields of “4.0 technology” or in other words: nanotechnology, biotechnology, information and communication technologies (ICT), cognitive sciences, and their convergence in the form of artificial intelligence (Vu, 2018).

The development of nanotechnology has created the potential for the production of “nano-weapons”, whose proliferation has been significantly facilitated compared to conventional and nuclear weapons (Kaspersen, 2015). Besides nanotechnology, 3D printing technologies also contribute to the production of a wide range of weapons, allowing avoiding the control of sales, imports, and/or exports. Developments in the fields of cognitive sciences, neurobiology, synthetic biology and pharmaceuticals, have contributed to the creation of (synthetic) drugs that can influence a person’s behaviour, in terms of its change and/or control (e.g. the so-called “Jihadist drug”, amphetamine and phenethylamine, are known to be used by terrorists in suicide missions to overcome fear of (fatal) outcome), while technological advances in the field of biotechnology and DNA profiling have opened the possibility of creating new, deadly viruses that can be used to harm the target group or population (Kaspersen, 2015; Vu, 2018).

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a new ICT technology that enables unlimited networking of devices to improve the way we live, work and communicate, but makes us unsafe. Namely, IoT allows collecting information about a person’s movements and life habits, which increases the vulnerability of a person because the attackers can use the information collected to steal personal information (e.g. identity). Since digital addiction makes us more vulnerable, the misuse of ICT in the form of cyberattacks or information warfare has enormous consequences in the network society and can cause great material and human losses (WEF, 2019). Namely, the vulnerability of modern societies has been increased by the realization that the targets of cyberattacks can be the structures and systems of particular, vital importance to the functioning of the community, causing devastating consequences for life and health of people, for the economy and the environment (e.g. cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007). However, the ICT sector can generate other, already wide-spread dangers, such as the “social engineering” technique or new forms of environmental threats, like the popular cryptocurrency Bitcoin (WEF, 2019). In a nutshell, all aspects of the state and society are exposed to attacks from the ICT sector.

Nevertheless, the greatest threat posed by Industry 4.0 to human security is the convergence of the mentioned 4.0 technologies embodied in artificial in-



telligence (AI), that is, an “intelligent machine” that could replace humans in production (Schwab, 2016). The analysis of the impact of artificial intelligence at the societal level shows the possibility of increased marginalization of poor, indigenous and vulnerable groups, as well as the level of inequality in society (Obar & McPhail, 2018; WEF, 2019). In addition to endangering the economic security of the individual, the security implications of AI technology could be significantly more dangerous. Namely, the combination of all these technologies, e.g. broad-ranging networks and artificial intelligence tools, has the potential to transform future conflicts at both conventional and strategic levels

(Kaspersen, 2015; Schwab, 2016; Hersman & Stadler, 2019; WEF, 2019). In fact, current conflicts already got hybrid in nature with a combination of conventional battlefield methods accompanied by the elements of informational and cyber warfare, while the globe represents the battlefield. The turning point in the changing nature of the conflict was the Gulf War, which indicated the introduction of new technologies (artificial intelligence and (semi-)autonomous weapons systems) into the battlefield.


Lastly, we should bear in mind that the set of mentioned Industry 4.0 threats and challenges is not final, and that as such it is a unique feature of the fourth industrial revolution.

#### *Summary of the main risks to individual security in Industry 4.0*

In order to gain a final observation of primary and unavoidable security challenges, risk and threats to security of the individuals and society that can be brought to us by 4IR, see Figure 1. As it can be seen, these are economic risks, that are associated, e.g. with high or false investments, or social risks such as the job losses. Investing in 4.0 technologies brings a high financial risk of incorrect investment in poor or often immature technologies, or economically unprofitable processes. Also, economic opportunities will be uncertain because many people may not have the skills needed for the jobs of the future. If states and communities are not fully prepared for the new wave of globalization, Globalization 4.0 may increase income inequality even if it can create more wealth. Besides the economics and social spheres, risks can be associated with technical risks,

e.g. technical integration, information and communication technology related risks such as data security, and legal and political risks, such as for instance unsolved legal clarity in terms of data possession. From a legal point of view, open questions need to be clarified with regard to e.g. data protection, handling and protection; jurisdiction; labour law; intellectual property; etc. Certain risks can be seen in the ecological sphere in sense of environmental degradation and pollution caused by increased waste generation and emissions due to the need for larger amounts of energy and raw materials in 4.0 technological processes. In a nutshell, Globalization 4.0 in conjunction with Industry 4.0 will produce many consequences which may not be foreseeable for now and for which the world is vastly unprepared.





**Figure 1.** Main risks of 4IR to individual security  
(Source: Kodym et al., 2020: 76)

Considering all mentioned, the question arises as to how to adequately face the security challenges and risks to human security in Globalization 4.0? As the new era of interconnectedness and technological advancement is creating the network society while humankind becoming more and more digitized and dependent on 4.0 technologies, the key answer lies in the “information security culture” of the individual and society.

Information security culture, as an imperative of modern society, consists of two elements: information security and security culture. Information security implies not only to eliminate all risk nor to determine the way of doing business, but to enable information technology users to use the benefits and advantages offered by modern technologies: on the Internet, local network, or completely isolated computer systems. Information security, in addition to protecting privacy and unhindered use of information technology, should also provide protection of intellectual and material infor-

mation assets of users and corporations. On the other hand, security culture is a set of adopted attitudes, knowledge, skills and rules in the field of security, expressed as behaviour and process, on the need, ways, and means of protection of personal, social, and international values from all sources, forms and bearers of threats, regardless of place or time of their manifestation (Stajić et al., 2006). In fact, security culture is closely related to our upbringing, values, and value systems that we support.

In sense of that, information security culture, according to Milanović & Radovanović (2015), is a product of individual and group values, expertise, and patterns of behaviour that characterize the commitment, style, and knowledge aimed at a “healthy atmosphere” in the society and management of security. Information security culture within the society manifests itself through various aspects of security related to values, behaviours, attitudes, actions, management activities, as well as the physical



environment. Summing up, the security culture of information technology users reflects, directly or indirectly, on their

overall security and protection from the risks to which they are exposed in the era of Globalization 4.0.

## **POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA UNDER THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE IN THE LIGHT OF INDUSTRY 4.0**

The Belt and Road Initiative connects more than 60 countries in the Asian, European and African continents, which together account for over 30% of global GDP, 62% of the population and 75% of known energy reserves (WEF, 2019). Due to the possibility of developing an intercontinental infrastructure network, increasing trade, and reducing temporal and spatial barriers between partner countries, all thanks to the development of technology, the Belt and Road Initiative is a unique example of Globalization 4.0. However, in addition to the potential to increase the national income and the quality of life of partner country residents, the Initiative simultaneously creates new security challenges and risks, and threatens the internal and external security of partner countries (Pop, 2016; World Bank, 2018).

Namely, security threats do not always appear in isolation and do not affect the reference facility in only one sector. Spill overs most often occur, which means that uncertainties arising in the social sector can easily spill over into the political sector, and thus cause instability of the political order in a country, which can result in spill over into the military sector and may lead to the acquisition of new weapon systems and the so-called "security dilemma". In the context of transnational cohesion and blurring of national borders, as in the case of the Belt and Road Initiative, the possibility of threat spill overs exists also beyond

the borders of one partner country. This would mean that threats against one partner country of the Initiative could easily become a threat to other partners of the Initiative.

The Belt and Road Initiative is made up of countries with different degrees of technological development, most of which can be categorized as developing countries, including the Republic of Serbia. Since the process of globalization is accompanied by a disproportion in the development of regions and countries, differences in the speed of technological development are becoming more pronounced. In addition to creating inequalities in terms of the degree of modernization and increased impact of other cultures, partner countries are at risk of uncontrolled refugee migration, religious terrorism, transnational organized crime, environmental threats, etc. (Haiquan, 2017; Cvetković, 2018). Due to differences in the states regarding the effective and efficient response to human security threats caused by differences in the level and speed of technological development and the countries' globalization index, it is not possible for all partner countries of the Initiative to be equally protected. This state of affairs is particularly pronounced in the field of information and communication technologies and critical infrastructure (Lam, 2015; Marácz, 2017). In relation to some Initiative partner countries, Serbia is, in this area, especially threat-





ened because of an insufficiently doctrinal and strategically regulated security system, which is a consequence of the ongoing security sector reform process (Mitrović, 2019).

As part of the Belt and Road Initiative, a major threat to Serbia's security comes from the ICT field, especially cyberspace. Due to its specific geopolitical and geostrategic position, the Republic of Serbia represents a potential target of contemporary terrorism, including its manifestation in cyberspace (Dragišić & Milošević, 2016). The significance of modern technologies as a threat is confirmed in the Serbian National Strategy for the Prevention and Combating Terrorism for the period 2017-2021. In fact, the Strategy states that the development and availability of state-of-the-art information and communication technologies have increased the risk of their misuse and extended beyond the system of communications, propaganda, recruitment and terrorist training (Nacionalna strategija za sprečavanje i borbu protiv terorizma, 2017). Due to the wide-spread use of ICT in all aspects of society, a large number of partner countries of the Belt and Road Initiative have already put in place mechanisms to respond to cyber incidents. Specifically, there are documents such as the Cybersecurity Framework for Critical Infrastructure Protection in the US; the European Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme with the Network and Information Security Directive in the EU; the Five-Year Plan for National Computerization (2016-2020) and the Law on Cyber Security with the Regulation on Critical Infrastructure Protection in China. However, Serbia is lagging behind in this area. There are security measures in place to protect ICT resources, but they are not sufficient for complete protection of crit-

ical infrastructure against cyberattacks (Rizmal, 2018; Todorović, 2018, Vujović, 2019).

Historically speaking, criminal law framework for opposing the cyber-crime in Serbia began to be built in 2003, with the adoption of the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code, when the criminal legislation was amended by the introduction of criminal offenses against computer data security. However, it is worth emphasizing that the notion of high-tech crime in Serbian legislation is broader than the scope of criminal offenses against computer data security (Milošević & Putnik, 2019). According to the Law on Organization and Competence of Public Authorities for Combating High-Tech Crime (2005), high-tech crime includes the commission of criminal offenses in which computers, computer systems, computer networks, computer data, as well as their products in material or electronic form, appear as an object or means of committing criminal offenses.

However, in the light of the latest emerging technological trends and recognizing the easy availability and possibility of misuse of modern information technologies, the Republic of Serbia adopted the Strategy for the Fight against High-Tech Crime for the period 2019-2023, thus widening the range of areas in which ICT could be misused, which were not covered by the National Strategy for Prevention and Combating Terrorism. A significant step towards more adequate ICT protection of critical infrastructure was the adoption of the Strategy for the Development of Information Security in the Republic of Serbia for the period 2017-2020. Other important documents that make up the regulatory framework for information security of the Repub-



lic of Serbia, including the protection against threats originating from cyberspace, are: the Law on Information Security; the laws on protection of personal data, data confidentiality, electronic signature, electronic document, electronic communications; the Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency; the National Security Strategy; etc. There are also the bodies established on the basis of these and similar documents, such as the National Centre for the Prevention of Security Risk in ICT systems, the Serbian National Internet Domain Registry, the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, etc. Essentially, it can be concluded that Serbia is on its way to raising and enhancing its level of information protection. However, if it does not accelerate the development of critical infrastructure, in this case the ICT sector, the advantages of its favourable geopolitical position can turn into weaknesses and endanger infrastructure security, and slow down economic development (Mišev et al., 2018).

Management of globalization is very often beneficial for the developed countries, which will not be an exception even

in the case of Globalization 4.0. Serbia, as developing country, needs to be aware of the fact that the Belt and Road Initiative includes economically dominant countries that seek to strengthen their influence in other regions and countries, and dictate the pace of technological development. In these circumstances, the question arises whether the economically weaker Initiative partner countries, such as Serbia, will be able to respond to the given challenge, i.e. whether they will be able to follow the speed of technological progress. Due to the existing differences in the degree of modernization and the globalization index, it is almost certain that the 4IR will not have the same impact on all Initiative partner countries, which will manifest in all aspects of society, including the ability to respond appropriately to threats. In a word, those countries that currently have (technological) potential will be able to respond to the most recent security threats at a given moment. Therefore, Serbia must pay particular attention to the promotion of the level of (information-)security culture in society, as well as to development of the technology sector and to safeguarding security against threats that may arise from it.

## CONCLUSION

Due to its complexity and multidimensionality, it is impossible to predict all the security implications of Industry 4.0. What is certain is that the fourth industrial revolution has consequences in all segments of society. 4IR has the potential to inflame the economic crisis and increase the level of unemployment and inequality in society; limit human rights and freedoms (e.g. in terms of restricting the right to freedom of expression

through the monopoly of the media); threaten national and cultural identities; cause environmental degradation, change the way the service sectors function, as well as the nature and extent of modern conflicts. Because of its ability to integrate all of these elements into a single globalization process and transform the world into a “global village”, as well as to produce threats to human security at local (e.g. insufficient level of



democratic development), regional (e.g. environmental degradation) and global (e.g. threatening national identity, internationalization of crime, terrorism) level, it can be concluded that Industry 4.0 has the potential to become a total threat to human security.

Given these facts, the question arises as to how to face and adequately address the potential challenges, risks, and threats to the security of the individual in the fourth industrial revolution?

The answer lies in the synergy of (information-)security culture, economic security and sustainable development, and technological advancement. Specifically, the fear of automation due to new technologies, job loss and livelihoods are the first challenges faced by individuals and society in Industry 4.0. In order to reduce the fears of the new industrial revolution, it is necessary to work on continuous education of the workforce in different 4.0 disciplines, such as digitalization, data analytics, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, etc.; to mitigate the risks of job loss; to improve the resilience of society; and prepare individuals and society to adequately respond to the new challenges of the future market and

labour. In addition, it is necessary to develop new skills in individuals, such as the ability to effectively and efficiently solve problems, critical thinking, emotional intelligence, cognitive flexibility. Moreover, building mutual trust, integrity, and tolerance in the network society is another step towards more adequate protection of the individual and society from the negative implications of Industry 4.0. Raising public awareness about security risks on the Internet, or the importance of critical infrastructure for the functioning of community, is a necessary step towards maintaining the stability of social order in crisis situations. Also, 4.0 technologies can be used to ensure greater transparency in the work of state and public institutions, thus creating the basis for building mutual trust. In this way, corruption, misuse of personal and medical data of citizens, and other similar problems, which are often linked to the work of these institutions, can be more easily addressed. Essentially, improving the level of (information-) security culture in the individuals and in society is the first and the most important response to the potential security challenges, risks, and threats that the fourth industrial revolution brings to us.

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Book review

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**Dalibor Elezović**

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*NATO aggression in the light of justice*

Kosovska Mitrovica: University of Pristina, Faculty of Philosophy, 2019, 345 p.

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A book entitled “*NATO aggression in the light of justice: conviction of the perpetrators of the NATO aggression on the FRY with accompanying comments*” was published by the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Priština, temporarily relocated to Kosovska Mitrovica, in 2019, on

the occasion of the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the NATO bombing of the FRY.

The campaign named “Operation Allied Force” began on March 24, 1999. It was a follow up of the failed negotiations in Rambouillet in February 1999 and in Paris in March of the same year. All

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this was preceded by conflicts between the military and police forces of the FRY and the KLA. The operation was unique in many ways because it was the first major use of NATO's armed force in its fifty-year-long history and the first time a force was used to implement the UN Security Council resolution without the approval of that same Council. This campaign is controversial in international relations precisely because the UN Security Council had not given its consent. In a statement from 23 April 1999, NATO stressed that military actions are directed not at the Serbian people but at the policies of the regime in Belgrade and underlined that they would continue their operation until Milošević accepts their demands. Milošević regime did not crack after a "couple of days" as NATO officials expected. The campaign that lasted for 78 days was ended by signing the Military Technical Agreement in Kumanovo on June 9, 1999. According to the agreement, the military and police forces of the FRY were obliged to withdraw from the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia within 11 days; a land security zone between Kosovo and the rest of the FRY was established; it was planned that the newly formed KFOR forces disarm the KLA members which was eventually done. A day after the signing of the agreement, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244.

The authors of the book, Dalibor Elezović, PhD, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Priština, Uroš Šuvaković, PhD, Full Professor at the Teacher Education Faculty, University of Belgrade, and Branko Rakić, PhD, Full Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade, prepared judicial documents and wrote the preface and additional texts on marking the anniversary

of NATO bombing on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Considering the publication of monographic editions of critical material as an important contribution to the knowledge of scientific truth, the authors presented to the readers the Verdict of the District Court in Belgrade K. No. 381/2000 from September 21, 2000, by which the leaders of the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the leaders of NATO itself were sentenced to 20 years in prison each for crimes committed during the NATO aggression on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Decision of the Supreme Court of Serbia Kž I 696/01 from July 31, 2001, on revoking that Verdict and returning for retrial is also published, as well as the following three decisions of the District Court in Belgrade: The Decision K. No. 449/2001 Kv. 1772/01 from September 10, 2001, on termination of detention and revocation of the order for issuing a warrant, the Decision K. No. 449/2001 Kv. 1788/01 from September 12, 2001 on suspending the proceedings due to the withdrawal of the District Public Prosecutor in Belgrade from the indictment, and the Decision K. No. 449/2001 Kv. 1819/01 from September 17, 2001, on actual incompetence for the criminal offense of violation of the territorial sovereignty of the state.

By publishing these documents, the authors wanted to present an authentic historical source primarily to the scientific public in order to refute the thesis that it is not known how many people were killed, how many were injured, what was destroyed, etc. Since the Verdict was passed at the time when all the data had not been summarized yet, the listed data are minimalistic, but precise and exact. The conclusion that the listed data are correct stems from the fact that from 2000 until today no one has disputed the facts stated in the Verdict, but





it has been revoked for formal reasons. Bearing in mind the fate of the archives in Serbia, both due to the negligent attitude towards the preservation of historical documents and the lack of understanding of their value as a guardian of memories, and due to the devastation committed by the enemy in our country during the two world wars, the significance of publishing historical sources is crystal clear. In addition, instead of interpreting the documents, where even if it comes from the scientific community, the danger of subjectivism has not been completely eliminated, it gives everyone the opportunity to draw their own conclusions about the relevant events by directly inspecting the documents.

As it is usual for this type of scientific publication, each author wrote a chapter in which he commented the Verdict from the aspect of the science and the profession he deals with – historical, socio-political and international law. Professor Dalibor Elezović pointed out the impor-

tance of the Verdict as an immediate, i.e. first-class historical source for studying the NATO aggression on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. Professor Uroš Šuvaković writes about the significance of the Verdict in the context of the immutability of the facts presented in it, which cannot be changed even under the influence of political circumstances, i.e. at the request of the authorities. Finally, Professor Rakić comments on the Verdict through the prism of international public law, focusing on the crime of aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in a situation where justice has failed.

Recommending this book both to the scientific and professional community, as well as to the public in general, we join the authors' hope that the published Verdict will encourage critical consideration of crimes committed during the NATO aggression and the application of justice on its perpetrators instead of gathering dust in the court depot.



